
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




1 Brunswick
2 An old Lüneburg Heath farmhouse
3 The Harz
4 Göttingen



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The German Tribune

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Andropov's unfulfilled German mission

DIE WELT

The late Mr Andropov did not have enough time between taking over from Mr Brezhnev in November 1982 and vanishing from public life last summer to draw up a clearly outlined policy on Germany.

But there are clear signs that the former KGB chief was keen, in spite of fundamental misgivings, on cooperative relations with Bonn.

He seems to have backed bids by the East German leader, Herr Honecker, in the same direction.

When Mr Andropov came to power Helmut Schmidt had been out of office in Bonn for a mere six weeks, but shortly before Mr Brezhnev died he responded to the change-over in Bonn.

In a greetings telegram to Chancellor Kohl he called for further development of relations between the two countries to the advantage of both peoples.

The new Soviet leader followed this approach. On 15 November 1982, when world leaders were in Moscow for Mr Brezhnev's funeral, he conferred for an hour with President Carstens and Foreign Minister Genscher.

This detailed discussion was clearly intended to be of demonstrative importance, as was shown when Mr Andropov expressly welcomed the new Chancellor's government policy statement as a sign of continuity.

It seems to have been an important realisation for the Soviet leader that a change of government in Bonn did not mean any change in the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Andropov, Carstens and Genscher agreed that "mutual advantageous cooperation between the USSR and the Federal Republic of Germany on the basis of treaties and agreements concluded" was to be further developed.

The new Soviet leader's level-headed line of argument impressed President Carstens. It was distinctly different from the at times mercurial manner of Mr Brezhnev.

The President was particularly struck by the breadth of Mr Andropov's knowledge.

So the change of power in Moscow seemed unlikely, at least after the first direct encounter, to take a turn for the worse from Bonn's point of view.

Against the background of Soviet economic requirements seen in a more disinterested light by Mr Andropov, new prospects of cooperation seemed to be in the offing.

Realistically, the Soviet concept taken over straight from Mr Brezhnev by Mr Andropov was bound to include the aim of gradually driving a wedge between the Federal Republic and its main ally, the United States.

This feature of Soviet foreign policy that has never been abandoned since the Federal Republic came into being in September 1949 became particularly strikingly apparent in the later course of the missile modernisation debate.

Mr Andropov's propagandists did not stop short at resorting to the long-established practice of first wielding the stick, then offering the carrot.

Even so, the second and last meeting he held with leading Bonn politicians took its course with a striking lack of emotion, although it cannot be said to have been unproblematic.

It was in July 1983 when Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Kohl visited Moscow, at a time of rising East-West tension. "He is a shrewd and well-informed interlocutor," the Chancellor said. "His state of health need lead no-one to reach mistaken conclusions." Their meeting was very nearly called off because the Soviet leader was seriously ill. The talks, Herr Kohl said, were "positive, informative and constructive from the viewpoint of the long-term development of relations." Mr Andropov's style of negotiating, Herr Genscher said, was "open and direct." He used hard arguments but did not resort to verbal confrontation. The two sides again affirmed that "in spite of clashes of ideological convictions and social policy views" long-term cooperation and the development of good-neighbourly relations were envisaged.

Meeting place: Moscow. The East Berlin party chief, Erich Honecker (left) and Bonn Chancellor Helmut Kohl together in Moscow, where they paid their last respects to the late Soviet President, Yuri Andropov. (Photo: dpa)

They failed, of course, to reach agreement on missile deployment by the West and the threat of a breakdown of arms control talks with the Americans by Moscow. But on other points, such as

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IN THIS ISSUE

Lebanon: chaos and despair in the rubble

STUTTGARTER NACHRICHTEN

Nothing seems to work any more in Lebanon. Whatever has been tried out to contain chaos and war or nip them in the bud has invariably ended in more dead, more rubble and more despair.

The parties in the civil war have proved unable to resolve the conflict. Israel's attempt to pacify the country by means of a lightning campaign and protect its own northern border on a long-term basis has failed.

There was also no point, it is now clear, in the well-meaning deployment of Italian, British, French and US troops as a peacekeeping force.

The Western units have proved too weak and the US policy of crisis management too short-winded.

Israel, invariably viewed by Washington as a guarantor of American Lebanon policy, has long felt overtaxed. Prime Minister Shamir will not be joining in President Gemayel's fight for political survival.

He is a trump card that is no longer good for a trick. Besides, the US concept of being on the spot at a crucial point in the East-West conflict has been a mistake.

In Lebanon it is not the Soviet Union that needs disciplining. Moscow is cautiously maintaining a low profile. Discipline needs to be imposed on Syria, and with it the Shiite, Druze and Palestinian militias.

In a war on many fronts in a country that is torn apart the US marines may succeeded in protecting themselves and in occasionally showing the flag by dealing out retaliatory blows, but the conflict can no longer be kept under control.

The Christian President, Amin Gemayel, has miscalculated. His hopes of relying on Western great-power support to hold his own against Syrian intervention have been dashed.

In vain does he now offer Opposition groups what he promised them months ago at the so-called reconciliation conference in Geneva.

He is offering them a share in power, realignment of the constitutional order and renunciation of the jealously guarded Christian claim to supremacy.

Washington has tried on several occasions, without much success, to persuade Gemayel to be more conciliatory on these points.

Yet heedless of the fact that he was abjectly dependent on the United States the youthful head of state remained obdurate for months, which now seems incomprehensible.

Now his write extends little further than the President's bunker his proposals are no longer worth much.

The Shiites and Druzes are taking by force of arms what was denied tham at the conference table. The Syrians are demonstrating their unbroken power and nuisance potential.

The Soviet Union is calmly looking on while the United States, powerful yet so powerless, is plunged ever deeper into the morass of a war that seems never to end.

Powerlessness must be a bitter new experience for President Reagan.

Bernd Stadelmann

(Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 8 February 1984)

■ WORLD AFFAIRS

War and peace: ball back in the experts' court

Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger

After an autumn that wasn't as hot as had been feared, and several weeks of ice age in East-West ties that have not seemed too chilly either, the debate on war and peace has evidently reverted to the experts.

They will be relieved. It saves them inconvenient questions, but also takes them further and further away from a target they must constantly bear in mind: that of ensuring public backing for their policies.

This reversion will have been the reason why an event went virtually unnoticed by the wider public that amounted to little short of a revolution in American security policy.

It was the kite flown by Mr Rowny, the chief US delegate to the Start talks in Geneva. He speculated publicly whether the Start and INF medium-range missile talks in Geneva might not be reactivated by a merger.

In the past Washington has felt the very idea to be heretical, let alone putting it into practice. Good and less good reasons were advanced in support of this US viewpoint.

One good reason was that two issues that individually are complex enough will not grow easier by being discussed together rather than separately.

Besides, dealing with the more difficult of the two problems, and many experts felt Start was the more difficult, would tend to delay a solution to the even more pressing isue of the arms build-up by both sides in Europe.

Washington was no less emphatic in endorsing reasons that carried less conviction, such as the argument that a merger could be viewed by Moscow as a concession.

First, the Soviet delegates could return to the conference table without losing face (albeit a fresh conference table).

Second, merging the two sets of talks could eliminate in a more or less elegant fashion the trickiest issue faced by both sides, that of how to take British and French nuclear forces into account.

When dealt with at the same conference table as the gigantic nuclear arsenals of the superpowers, the Anglo-French nuclear deterrent hardly seems to matter.

Hitherto the United States has been keen to avoid as much as the appearance of any such concession.

The American argument is that unlike the United States, which carried on negotiating in spite of continued deployment of Soviet SS-20 missiles, the Soviet delegations had walked out of the talks the moment the first medium-range US missiles were deployed in Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany.

So there was no need to pay any price whatever for the return of the Soviet delegations to Geneva.

This argument has a plausible ring, but it is none too reassuring given the explosive nature of the topic, and least reassuring of all for Germans and Europeans in East and West.

They would be hardest-hit by any consequences of a final breakdown of these talks in particular.

Whatever importance one attaches to the denials issued in the wake of Mr Rowny's first tentative suggestion at the end of January, one point seems reasonable clear.

It is that the Soviet Union could now, if it wanted, suggest the merging of the two sets of talks without needing to fear that Washington would reject the idea out of hand.

That at least is left of the kite flown by the US chief delegate after the various denials that followed it.

It is trend in keeping with the recent change President Reagan has shown signs of, given that he must be worried he might not secure re-election if he were to continue to behave as an implacable enemy of the Soviet Union.

But how will Moscow respond in reality? Regardless how the Russians rate Mr Rowny's kite, it is extremely doubtful whether they will want to help the President to improve his prospects of re-election.

They have lately taken to criticisin Mr Reagan withut the slightest trace of their previous diplomatic restraint.

There are few signs that Moscow would prefer to see a difficult but known incumbent re-elected as the lesser of two evils, the other being the risk of having to adjust to a possibly less aggressive but unknown successor to Mr Reagan in the Oval Office.

Besides, the Soviet leaders are likely to be fairly inflexible in the near future after the death of Mr Andropov.

If they were nonetheless to take up the heavily hedged American offer, there would still be a long and arduous round of negotiations to complete before a compromise might appear feasible on the most critical issue for Europe, that of medium-range missiles.

Pointless

The same goes for Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's proposal for the five nuclear powers to negotiate at a new body and for the Mexican proposal at the UN disarmament conference in Geneva, which has got virtually nowhere in years of talks.

Missile deployment goes ahead unabated. By the beginning of next year at the latest, especially in respect of Pershing 2s, which are only to be stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany, a stage will have been reached at which further talks are bound to seem more or less pointless in Soviet eyes.

The only circumstance in which they would not be pointless would be if Washington were to declare itself ready to dismantle weapon systems already deployed.

That seems hardly likely inasmuch as the Russians seem unlikely to make correspondingly attractive counter-proposals.

So in a year's time at the latest people in the Federal Republic will have to live with the idea that in addition to SS-20s stationed in the Soviet Union modern short-haul missiles with a delivery time of three minutes are aimed at targets in

Continued on page 3



Getting together: Hans-Jochen Vogel, SPD Bundestag leader (left) is greeted in Washington by US Secretary of State George Shultz. (Photo: …)

Vogel urges Nato initiative to get arms talks going again

Hans-Jochen Vogel, SPD leader in the Bonn Bundestag, has called on Nato to make the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact a "specific and comprehensive offer" to get the stalled arms control and disarmament talks back on the move.

In a speech to the Overseas Writers' Club in Washington he said the removal of US medium-range missiles lately deployed in Europe came high on the list of SPD priorities.

The superpowers could make headway on disarmament if both sides were to meet each other half-way and to ugree to a temporary ban on fresh deployment later this year with progress in mind.

Herr Vogel was in Washington to outline the Social Democrats' attitude toward Nato and future military strategy of the North Atlantic pact.

He first conferred with Vice-President Bush and State Department officials and other security experts. At the end of a three-day visit he held talks with Secretary of State Shultz.

The main aim of his political talks was to dispel doubts on the part of the US administration as to the Bonn Opposition SPD's loyalty to Nato.

In his speech to the Overseas Writers' Club he mentioned unclarities and misunderstandings that had arisen in American as to the German Opposition's views following the anti-deployment resolution by the Social Democratic party conference.

He thus saw his task as partly that of rectifying these distorted views. The SPD, he said, was firmly in favour of the Atlantic alliance, but it also felt that disputes within the alliance should be had out in public.

The Nato offer of a resumption of promising disarmament talks to the Soviet Union, as envisaged by the SPD, would need to incorporate the following features:

— A merger of the talks on intercontinental and medium-range missiles with a view to reducing nuclear armament;

— reduction and abolition of chemical weapons, gradually and by region if need be;

— the signing of a treaty reducing troops strenths and armament in Europe on the basis of ceilings already agreed;

— agreement on confidence-building measures designed to include the option of nuclear-free corridors.

The SPD also felt it was essential to embark on a new and constructive debate on future Nato strategy aiming at a strategy paying greater heed than hitherto to the political objective of preventing war and the defensive character of armed forces.

Herr Vogel stressed that Social Democrats stood by the existing Nato strategy and would do so until a new strategy was agreed.

Within this framework the Western Europeans would have to bear their role in Nato more clearly in mind and make a greater point than in the past of speaking with one voice in dealings with the United States.

Only then could the current state of affairs be replaced by the partnership of equals to which President Kennedy had referred over 20 years previously.

After his first round of talks in Washington Herr Vogel was reported by *dpa* to have told a press conference he had encountered understanding of the SPD's view that the breakdown of the East-West dialogue was unsatisfactory and could not remain a permament state of affairs.

But there were no signs yet of "specific initiatives" to reactivate the dialogue by the United States over and above what had so far been said.

He stressed that more must be done than to express readiness to hold talks to get the disarmament talks going again.

In Washington interest had been voiced in the idea of combining the medium-range and Start missile talks, but had yet to be viewed as a specific position, not even in the form of a proposal, he said.

Martin E. Süskind

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 9 February 1984)

The German Tribune

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HOME AFFAIRS

Likelihood that system will eventually revert to three parties

Germany's political party structure was for a long time stable. Perhaps even rigid.

From the late 1950s until the beginning of the 1980s there were two major parties, the CDU/CSU and the SPD. Plus a smaller party, the FDP.

One was conservative, Christian-social and liberal, the other social democratic-socialist. The FDP's staunch economic liberalism was initially coupled to nationalist ideas. It later increasingly shifted towards left-wing liberal domestic policies.

When the Federal Republic was formed in 1949, there were many parties. Why did they disappear? Why did no new parties emerge?

The answer is that the CDU/CSU, SPD and FDP met the needs of the electorate.

The CSU/CSU attracted the Christian-social, conservative and, to some extent, nationalist elements.

It even became the representative of economic liberalism, federalism and regionally orientated elements.

It championed the interests of ethnic Germans displaced from their home areas.

The SPD served social democratic and socialistic trends. With its rejection of re-armament and Nato, its neutralism and pacifism, it also appealed to the national yearnings of a beaten nation.

Eventually, the left-wing liberal ideas that were in any event part of its heritage gained weight in the party.

The FDP was the purest embodiment of economic liberalism. In the early stages this was coupled with a nationalist drive; but was more and more replaced by a liberal legal and domestic policy that started tending towards left wing liberalism in the mid-1960s.

So there was something for everybody.

Two trends emerged at the beginning of the 1980s: one was a mixture of ecological awareness anti-industrial emotionalism and the rejection of modern civilisation based on material gain.

The other was marked by fear of war, lack of interest in defence, by neutralism and a muted stress on interests passed off as "national".

These two trends would actually have called for two (or more) new parties.

In the end, they resulted in one new movement, mostly calling itself the Greens though sometimes also the Alternatives.

The reason for this is that the two bundles of interests are seen by their protagonists as belonging together.

What other explanation is there for the fact that no party that would be both ecological and middle-class — a sort of Green CDU or FDP — has emerged?

Some of the new ideas will pass as all fads pass — especially in their present exaggerated form. This is shown by the ebbing campaign against the Nato missile deployment.

Other trends will prove more durable. But it is still questionable whether the Green-Alternative party will remain. Probably not.

The SPD opened up towards the ideas of the new party, first hesitantly and after the change of government in Bonn rather hastily. This applies particularly to the main elements of the new party: the ecological-alternative and the neutralist-pacifist.

In more and more areas where the Greens-Alternatives are politically in evidence there are signs of a lasting cooperation with the SPD.

The new party will shed its sect-like and fundamentalist branch and adjust to the SPD. The SPD, in its turn, will adjust to the Greens — though the extent will vary, depending on conditions.

There is much to indicate that the Greens-Alternatives will one day be absorbed by the SPD, as was the case with Gustav Heinemann's Gesamtdeutsche Volkspartei party in the 1950s.

Plenty of reasons will be put forward on both sides. The Greens will point to the need for *realpolitik*, that fragmentation helps only the enemy and that society can only be changed by a major party.

The SPD could well say that the Greens-Alternatives are essentially fighting for the old aims of the socialist movement and that it is a historic task to create a "majority left of the CDU/CSU."

Should this happen, there would again be three parties — if, of course that the FDP survives the setbacks it suffered after the change of government in Bonn. This is not yet certain, but it is becoming increasingly likely.

The likelihood is substantiated by the fact that many economic liberals have remained wary of the CDU/CSU. And many voters regard economic liberalism as something that goes hand-in-hand with left-wing liberalism in domestic and legal affairs.

Then there is the fact that many voters are looking for a small and distinguished party.

But a return to the old three-party system need not mean that everything will be as it was.

If the SPD were to absorb more than just a Greens-Alternatives residue, it would change internally and its axis would shift to the left.

This would not necessarily mean a radically more leftist policy. After all, even in its current cooperation with the Greens-Alternatives the SPD has been shifting to the left — and not only in Hesse.

A return to the old three-party system would result in more advantages than disadvantages.

The system does have its faults. But it has resulted in stable governments, making changes of government more difficult, without preventing them.

The present fourth party does not make for more rational politics.

And there is no telling whether another party in its place would be any better.

Johann-Georg Reissmüller

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 8 February 1984)

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the readiness of Mr Andropov and Foreign Minister Gromyko to renegotiate on a realistic basis bilateral agreements on scientific and technological cooperation, cultural exchange and legal assistance that had previously come to grief over the status of West Berlin, a new start seemed possible.

Nothing has yet come of this project, but Mr Gromyko reaffirmed to Herr Genscher in Stockholm last month that it was still on the cards as far as Moscow was concerned.

In contrast to earlier Bonn-Moscow summits Mr Andropov and his aides did not rule out discussion of intra-German ties with Herr Kohl and Herr Genscher. The argument had always been that the GDR was a sovereign state, so it could not be discussed. This time it was discussed, and although views differed, there was a desire for improvement.

Herr Honecker who, like the Russians, was primarily interested in flourishing ties with the Kohl government for economic motives, clearly felt able to rely on Mr Andropov for support in this respect.

The billion-deutschemark loan to the GDR underwritten to Bonn last summer indirectly eased the pressure on Moscow.

Bernt Conrad

(Die Welt, 11 February 1984)

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Germany from the GDR and Czechoslovakia.

By the same token, the Soviet Union west of Moscow will be threatened by Pershing 2s with a flight time of between six and 14 minutes.

It would seem to be derisory to propose confidence-building measures in such a situation.

But what is one to do: ignore or forget it? Sad to say, that in no way reduces the constantly growing danger.

Hans Gerlach

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 10 February 1984)

Polls show government is still popular despite scandals

Scandals always catch the headlines. The routine doesn't.

The uproar over the Flick party donations investigation and the Wörner-Kiessling scandal has pushed the solid and certainly not unsuccessful day-to-day work of the Kohl-Genscher government into the background.

But politics is more than just passing sensations and outrage over the mistakes of an individual minister and his bureaucracy.

A big majority of the public seems unaffected by the turbulence of the past few weeks.

Opinion polls by three top institutes show a stable picture for the CDU/CSU.

If an election were held now either the CDU/CSU and FDP coalition would continue in government or the CDU/CSU would gain an absolute majority.

The SPD share of the vote is stabilising around 30 per cent while the FDP is near the crucial five per cent hurdle and thus still at risk.

Despite their behaviour in Bonn and elsewhere, the Greens would seem assured of sufficient voters to remain in the Bundestag in any election.

The opinion samplings were taken on 20 January, at the height of the Wörner-Kiessling affair, so that is encouraging for Chancellor Kohl.

The faith of most people in the conservative-liberal government seems undiminished, boosted by clear indications that the economy is on the mend.

Naturally, the average voter is not happy with the Bonn scandals. But what really matters is the state of the deutschemark and the money in his pocket.

The man-in-the-street gives priority to job security and the permanence of internal and external peace.

Many people still regard Helmut Kohl as a dependable guarantor of a policy that will put the nation back on its feet.

This continued faith is surprising — and not only in view of the affairs in Bonn.

After all, the Chancellor has departed from the tradition of doling out government gifts in dribs and drabs. Instead he has been doling out sacrifices.

But even the victims will accept austerity measures if they lead to success.

Inflation is down and the two to three per cent economic growth forecast for this year is based on full order books in many branches of industry.

The president of one chamber of commerce and industry has tersely told a meeting: "The upturn is here."

Industrial action slogans are out of place in this general mood of optimism that has even weathered the heated missile debate.

Union leaders in the metal and printing sectors are faced with growing disenchantment among their members who fear that they could be drawn into an industrial dispute just as the long awaited upturn is getting off the ground.

The workers realise that a strike at this stage of the economic development would mean a major setback.

It is therefore understandable that the contemplated industrial action to bring about the 35-hour work week is extremely unpopular among union members.

They know how much their jobs depend on the upturn. A political trial of strength between some unions and a Bonn government they resent would not meet with general approval.

It is therefore to be hoped that the parties to collective bargaining will find an economically feasible compromise.

But the good news from the pollsters should not deceive the government into believing that its policy of change is over the hump.

The coalition has avowed that it is interested not only in economic stability but also in spiritual leadership and political ethics.

The Bonn affairs have cast a shadow on these aspirations.

There is much left for the Chancellor to do as the voter bides his time.

Hermann Dexheimer

(Allgemeine Zeitung Mainz, 4 February 1984)

■ GERMANY

Challenge that faces any government in Berlin

West Berlin CDU leader Eberhard Diepgen, 42, has been elected Governing Mayor by the House of Representatives. He succeeds Richard von Weizsäcker, who is expected to be nominated as the next Bonn President.

Richard von Weizsäcker has resigned as mayor of Berlin to succeed Karl Carstens as Bonn head of state. Is it the end of an era in the divided city?

Possibly not. But it has been an important stage in the city's development, if only a brief one.

For just over three years the two major parties sent leading politicians to look after affairs in West Berlin.

One was sent to stem the tide of decline, the alarming rate at which the party previously in power was losing its grip.

The other was intended to put this power vacuum to good use and bring about a change of government.

Three years ago Hans-Jochen Vogel was elected governing mayor and entrusted with looking after the legacy of a fairly sick and care-worn coalition.

In spite of the hard work he devoted to the task he was able to do no more than alleviate the repercussions of decline and soon had to hand over to Richard von Weizsäcker, who beat him at the polls.

Weizsäcker had taken over as Opposition leader in Berlin some time earlier; Vogel stayed on for a while as leader of the new Opposition.

For a time West Berlin could pride itself on having the best men for the job as both mayor and Opposition leader. Now it has neither. Both are back in Bonn. Where does that leave Berlin?

First, the people of Berlin have seen for themselves over the past three years what politics can be like. The memory will remain, at least as a spur and a critical foil.

At the same time people in the city who are politically aware will have appreciated that while weak politicians can accelerate decline even outstanding personalities have difficulty in solving hopelessly snarled-up problems and structures.

The commitment shown first by Social Democrat Hans-Jochen Vogel, then by Christian Democrat Richard von Weizsäcker will be sure to have impressed and encouraged West Berliners.

But they will continue for the foreseeable future to face the task for which they need this very courage.

West Berlin has often been termed an outpost or a front-line city. Such slogans, like all catchphrases, are both right and wrong.

In Berlin's case the front-line epithet has long grown ambiguous and contradictory.

In the days of the Cold War West Berlin (and its protecting powers) testified to both the values of free society and the West's will to self-assertion in the international confrontation.

In principle this didn't change much in the detente era, but in the processes of normalisation made possible by both overall detente and Bonn's new Ostpolitik and policy on Germany the tension that was partly a threat and partly a challenge to the people of Berlin was also normalised.

Having been taken down a peg or two, as it were, the Berliners were said to have felt a little wide of their bearings and no longer sure just where they stood.

Whatever truth there may be in this observation, a more important point is that West Berlin went on to become a front-line city in an entirely different sense.

It had previously stood for the advantages of a free society. From the early 1970s the problematic aspects of free society grew particularly apparent in the city.

They included the recession, the limits to the welfare state, signs of degeneration of party politics, criticism of civilisation and the partly angry, partly apathetic rejection of the established system by the younger generation.

These critical shortcomings were exacerbated by obvious problems with a bungled housing policy, by imbalance in generation patterns, by the large percentage of foreign residents and by the disadvantageous location of West Berlin industry, a location problem that defies solution.

Only the city's cultural activities enjoyed a reputation extending well beyond Berlin's borders.

The arts may be subsidised to the hilt but arts policy will still be far less expensive than slum clearance. It also has a strictly limited effect on living conditions of the majority of the people.

Not even the political elite of all parties could readily have dealt with problems of such magnitude. What made it worse was that West Berlin went to the dogs with jobs for the boys and politically appointed bureaucrats, ruling out effective control.

Vogel and Weizsäcker were able to do no more than provide initial stimuli for change.

The city is now governed by a local mayor again, but there is always the risk of a return to the shortcomings of old.


Everything that has so far been said about Berlin's much-vaunted function as a turntable between East and West may have a limited significance in terms of cultural exchange and the "consciousness industry."

In the final analysis West Berlin is not leading a sheltered existence; it is living on borrowed time. That is why it remains dependent on the protecting

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One goes out, one comes in. Outgoing Berlin Governing Mayor Richard von Weizsäcker (left) with his successor, Eberhard Diepgen. (Photo: dpa)



Bastian quits the parliamentary Greens

Gert Bastian has carried out his threat to resign as a Green MP in the Bonn Bundestag. It was arguably a predictable move.

As a former Bundeswehr general he can hardly have imagined seriously that a single threat to resign would persuade the parliamentary party to toe a line.

He has thrown in his towel because he was sick and tired of the lack of concepts and the constant justification debates among Greens and Alternatives.

His resignation from the parliamentary party is also logical inasmuch as he felt he was being misused for propaganda purposes by fellow-Green MPs.

They were using him as a former Bundeswehr general to given the ecological movement an anti-American and anti-Western defence slant.

His accusation that the Greens are partly infiltrated by Communist cadres, especially former Maoists, has not been disproved either.

Gert Bastian has not ruled out the possibility of a return to the fold in certain circumstances, but his resignation is likelier to be the beginning of the end of the Green and Alternative movement's parliamentary existence.

A process of erosion is certainly apparent. It needs only two other Green MPs to follow in his footsteps for the Greens to forfeit their status as a separate party in the Bundestag.

As yet they are still able to seal a few rifts in the parliamentary party's ranks but the chips will be down when the present MPs are expected to hand over to others waiting in the wings.

It takes little power of prophecy to forecast that a fair number of Green MPs will then discover they have never been very enthusiastic about the principle of rotation as a feature of basic democracy.

Bodo Schulte

(Nordwest Zeitung, 10 February 1984)

■ PERSPECTIVE

Thrashing out alternative defence ideas

Alternative strategies were the subject of a hearing held in Bonn by a Bundestag defence committee that is extremely busy at the moment.

In addition to the hearing it is going about its normal business and starting work as a commission of enquiry into the Kiessling Affair.

On the opening day of the hearing five experts made submissions. They were Karl Kaiser of the German Foreign Policy Association, Joachim Seiffert of Kiel University, Dr Lübckemeier of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Dr Lutz of Hamburg University peace research department and Dean Gramm, a high-ranking Bundeswehr chaplain.

Professor Kaiser said that given the prevailing overall conditions of East-West conflict there could be no dispensing with the deterrent.

The West could thus not abandon the flexible response strategy it had adopted to prevent war.

He favoured dispensing with the concept of alternative strategy inasmuch as genuine alternatives did not exist for the reason stated and it could only be a matter of ensuring that the flexible response strategy was put to optimum effect.

All strategies had to fulfil three requirements. They must prevent war, maintain freedom and be assured of democratic endorsement.

Professor Kaiser was critical of the absolute importance that seemed to have been given to preventing war. Preserving peace, an indispensable objective, was dangerously disregarded to the point of toying with unacceptable better red than dead ideas.

He attributed to various reasons the acceptance crisis the nuclear deterrent was undergoing. One was that many people were no longer prepared to accept that four decades of peace in Europe amid a world at war had only been possible because the risk of nuclear war had acted as a deterrent.

The main argument against a no first use undertaking in respect of nuclear weapons was that it decisively reduced the risk any aggressor ran and thereby made conventional warfare more probable.

Any such demand presupposed the establishment of a conventional balance. All the countries of Western Europe could afford was to raise the nuclear threshold..

Entirely ruling out the use of nuclear weapons in defending Western Europe in the event of a Warsaw Pact attack would entail costs so enormous as to go way beyond the realms of what was feasible.

Professor Seiffert dealt with the crisis of the socialist economic system and with the Soviet concept of parity in military strategy.

He pointed out that Moscow continued to be guided by its foreign policy and military strategy concept of "permanent change of the international balance of power in favour of socialism."

By the terms of this concept so-called peaceful coexistence was a temporary peace at the end of which the communist system would gain supremacy and the entire world as its sphere of influence.

He stressed that this view of peaceful coexistence warranted the justification of war as the continuation of politics by means of military force whenever it served the interests of progressive forces.

It was thus only logical for the Warsaw Pact states to use their military potential as a political factor in their concept aimed at constant change in the international balance of power.

The Soviet view of parity in military strategy amounted to the Soviet Union itself having to have the capability to declare the status quo in the East Bloc irreversible.

Yet Moscow must also be able to wield a decisive influence on domestic conflict in the West and in the developing countries.

Results so far of the Soviet political and military strategy concept indicated that it had failed to work. The deployment of medium-range US missiles in Europe was a setback for global Soviet strategy.

"The strategic finality of the Soviet concept is beginning to be transformed into its opposite: the global balance of power is tipping the other way and forcing the Soviet superpower to take decisive action."

The danger, Professor Seiffert added, lay in the possibility of the Soviet Union continuing to build up its military power and intensifying its threats.

A more encouraging prospect would be if the Soviet Union were to decide to come to a political compromise with the West that provided it with an opportunity of dealing with its domestic problems.

The West could best promote this process by looking after its own security interests while offering to cooperate in the economic sector "and to establish a just and lasting peace order in Europe in the sense of the Harmel Report."

Lübckemeier dealt with what he felt were the main reasons for the crisis Western strategy was undergoing.

He mentioned the credibility problem of the nuclear deterrent and stressed the decline in confidence in the ability of governments as risk managers.

This problem of risk management was particularly important and had largely arisen as a result of the interruption in detente policy.

It was also a fundamental aspect of the nuclear deterrent that it was acceptable as a long as it was unlikely to be used, whereas acceptance declined and vanished as soon as it had to work as a matter of survival.

He was strongly opposed to the threat of first use of nuclear weapons. He advocated a "denuclearisation" of strategy.

A measure of improvement in Nato's conventional forces would be indispensable, but funds would only be available if the North Atlantic pact were to devise a convincing military and political concept of safeguarding peace.

It would need to include cooperation and detente with the Soviet Union and would decide on the success of a denuclearisation policy.

Safeguarding the peace remained first and foremost a political task.

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 7 February 1984)

Continued from page 4

powers and the Federal Republic of Germany.

What West Berlin needs is solidarity, and above all political leaders who can promote solidarity and guarantee that political and economic assistance is put to good use.

This is the challenge the new city government faces.

Robert Leicht

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 10 February 1984)

A look into non-nuclear ways of maintaining peace

Former CDU general secretary Kurt Biedenkopf has for some time been concerned with the possibility of preserving peace without nuclear weapons.

What particularly interests him is the extent to which it has come to influence the general public, rather than a handful of individuals, in the so-called peace debate.

Its influence on the CDU/CSU, the senior partner in the Bonn coalition, is interesting too.

Christian Democrats find it extremely difficult to discuss with due calm questions arising from the existence of nuclear weapons. TV journalist Franz Alt is a case in point.

Professor Biedenkopf recently sought to underpin, in an essay in a book entitled *Die Atomschwelle heben* (Raise the Nuclear Threshold), his view that preserving the peace with arms depends on public approval.

Given this need for public approval and support, efforts must be undertaken to relegate to an increasingly minor role the part to be played by nuclear weapons.

This, he argues, is absolutely essential as people are steadily less ready to tolerate what he calls the "nuclear borderline situation."

Biedenkopf drew up this concept over two years ago to make his point that peace preservation today by Nato and the Warsaw Pact resembles the situation of mountaineers who have lost their way on a sheer rock face and can no longer go either up or down.

This is a striking piece of imagery but



Kurt Biedenkopf ... seeking new strategy. (Photo: Poly-Press)

Biedenkopf's critics wonder whether it is an accurate comparison.

They are anxious to conduct their dispute with him to as little public attention as possible, probably at the next session of the appropriate CDU committee.

His long-term aim is to replace peace preservation that is unable to dispense with the nuclear deterrent by a new approach to keeping the peace in freedom that derives its strength from a political peace order in Europe.

That is CDU policy. The CDU's May 1982 Berlin Declaration states: "We will have to live with the nuclear borderline situation for the foreseeable future.

"It obliges us to seek wholeheartedly a feasible political peace order that might gradually take the place of the prevention of war by means of military deterrence."

Even so, he can hardly feel too sure of himself if he refers to this statement in his defence. It was he who drew it up.

He coined the term "nuclear borderline situation" in an essay published in *Die Zeit* in 1981 and forced the Christian Democrats to discuss it.

In the course of a lengthy process of change the former CDU general secretary has emerged as a pundit who feels Nato strategy, based as it expressly is on the first use of nuclear weapons, is in need of replacement.

In his new book *Die Atomschwelle heben* he writes: "The nuclear deterrent is intended to safeguard peace in Europe temporarily until an alternative has been found that guarantees security mainly politically and not primarily by military means."

He bases his departure from Nato strategy on the obvious shortfall in public approval of Western security policy in connection with implementation of the dual-track decision.

He refers with regret to the "nuclear borderline situation" facing mankind and to what he sees as an intolerable lack of solutions that besets peace preservation today.

This being the case, he calls for something new. It never occurs to him to ask whether the valid strategy really leads to a state of affairs to which there is no solution.

Franz Böckle, the Cathlic moral theologian, finds such behaviour extremely suspicious. In general terms he recently told the Bundeswehr staff college in Blankenese, Hamburg, that "our constant calling Nato strategy into question does a disservice to the cause of peace."

Professor Böckle said ethical responsibility for discussing security policy must be borne in mind. Does Kurt Biedenkopf do this responsibility justice?

He himself must subjectively be convinced he does. But even he will have to admit there is a great deal of utopian thinking involved inasmuch as the main feature of European politics remains the Soviet striving for supremacy.

Doubts must be voiced as to Biedenkopf's understanding of Nato strategy. You cannot very well complain of the general public not accepting what you yourself have misinterpreted.

Fellow-Christian Democrat Alois Mertes, Minister of State at the Foreign Office, has pointed out Biedenkopf's foremost misinterpretation of strategy:

"There is no such thing as the undertaking Biedenkopf claims to exist that nuclear systems will never be used. It would pull the rug from under Western strategy.

"It would also make conventional war more likely and with it, in the final analysis, the nuclear borderline situation."

Bundeswehr inspector-general Wolfgang Altenburg, for instance, describes the Bonn government's efforts and those of the entire Western alliance:

"The aim is to create conventional strength. A high degree of conventional capacity makes us independent of the nuclear theatre option and the inevitable consequences of nuclear escalation.

"I should like the first use of nuclear weapons to be a politically motivated use, with politicians making the decision to redress the balance of deterrence and end the fighting."

Rüdiger Moniac

(Die Welt, 4 February 1984)

■ THE ECONOMY

Government expects increase in growth and investment

Bonn's annual economic report expects: growth this year of 2.5 per cent compared with only 1.2 last year; unemployment to drop from 2.26 million to 2.2 million; investment to rise; retail prices to rise only 3 per cent; and demand, output and incomes to rise faster than last year. The report was compiled by Economic Affairs Minister Count Lambsdorff.

The recovery of the German economy has followed a pattern different from the course of past economic cycles.

This time the economy has regained momentum even though exports have failed to lead the way, tending indeed to put a damper on the upturn.

Export orders used invariably to be the driving force behind economic recovery. It now seems to have been rekindled and could well put on speed.

Demand from abroad has definitely increased since late autumn, though not in equal measure in all industries, but it can already be said to be widespread.

Estimates for 1984 have recently been revised upwards. Exports may, it is now felt, increase by between five and six per cent in real terms.

The main reason is that the international economy is out of the doldrums, having been pulled out of the trough by the United States and Canada, where growth has been unexpectedly brisk.

Economic recovery has been almost as boisterous in Japan, spreading to other industrialised countries, with the developing countries benefiting from buying by others who have made more headway.

As a result world trade, which last year increased by a little over one per cent, is likely to grow by five per cent in 1984, which is incidentally, far from unusual.

It is a growth rate that was common as recently as in the 1970s, although it was invariably followed by a decline. But this time the risk is less serious.

The groundwork has been laid more soundly: Inflation has been curbed considerably, and not only in the Federal Republic, and governments have resisted the temptation to go in for pump-priming.

Attempts are being made to contain government debts in many countries, although not in the United States. And these are not the only differences.

In contrast with the 1970s economic trends are not keeping step. Some countries are in the lead, others are trailing, and Germany is at present in the midfield.

Even if economic recovery were to falter in countries that are front runners at present, the others have made so much headway by now that they can lend further impetus.

Growth rates will clearly be lower than if all countries were to forge ahead simultaneously, but there is a much better chance of the upturn lasting longer and inflation not getting out of hand.

That is definitely a very much more favourable configuration for the growth process in the Federal Republic, which is not to say that all the risks that beset the world economy have been dealt with.

Many Third World countries are still deeply in debt. But even they will find the situation easier to cope with if they are able to boost exports.

If they are to be able to do so the industrialised countries must keep their markets open and reverse the trend toward protectionism that has been set in of late.

It is wishful thinking to expect the many tariff and non-tariff barriers to be lifted once the upturn has definitely established itself.

The United States is by no means the only country to prove this is not the case. In Europe too the temptation to put foreign competitors at a disadvantage is substantial.

Both trade unions and employer are leaning heavily on governments to support home industry in view of high unemployment.

So politicians everywhere will need to go to great lengths to remedy the situation, and the fight against protectionism is a key issue at international conferences to be held this year.

But in view of the US Presidential election campaign prospects of steps in the direction of freer world trade being taken this year are slight.

Hopes are placed in the mid-1980s, and they are not unfounded. Free trade would certainly further improve the outlook for German exports, which in spite of catcalls have held their own remarkably well against competition.

Exports are already a mainstay of the upswing, ranking alongside investment, and the more investment there is, the more technological innovations are imported.

That is sure to shore up the ability of German industry to stay competitive, a point that has been called into question to an unwarranted extent. Much would be easier if interest rates were to decline, but the outlook is still extremely bright, all told. Before long the old adage that when exports get going it can't be long before *domestic business* picks up should apply again.

Hans-Jürgen Mahnke
(Die Welt, 6 February 1984)

Economic outlook in Bonn
Annual economic report

	1983 estimated	1983 actual	1984 estimated
Economic growth in per cent	±0	+1.2	+2.5
Inflation in per cent	+4	+3.0	+3
Unemployment in per cent	9.5	9.1	9

G 5002

Good reactions all-round to Lambsdorff's report

Economic Affairs Minister Count Lambsdorff's economic report for 1984 is a fine job of work, and its most striking feature is that it owes its success to neither the favourable economic data nor binding announcements of specific tax, research, energy or welfare policy measures.

The report provides a cohesive outline of an economic policy aimed in many ways at reactivating market forces that have been blocked.

This explanation of the basic ideas behind a policy aimed first and foremost at reducing unemployment is invaluable for purposes of public discussion.

This is true regardless whether you happen to feel the methods advocated are right or wrong.

The response from some quarters of the business community has been enthusiastic, which could be taken to mean that the report is sympathetic towards the interests of capital or the entrepreneur.

But the trade union response proves that the Minister has succeeded in putting across his economic policy objectives in a way that eliminates suspicion on this score.

He can no longer be suspected of indifference to the unemployment figures or of making common cause with the employers to redistribute power and earnings in their interest.

Economic policy spokesmen for the SPD Opposition will themselves know best that their verdict, which is that the government has no answer to the problem of unemployment, ignores the report. Views may differ on how to deal with the problem and how much needs doing, but no-one can deny that Count Lambsdorff has put together a convincing package consisting of seemingly disparate aspects of economic policy.

They include a reduction in public borrowing requirement, priority for reducing wage bills and partial deregulation of labour regulations.

They are plausibly arranged in a suggested solution to the problem aimed at reactivating economic dynamism and so creating new jobs.

With the publication of the 1984 economic report the Minister can no longer be accused of inability to outline other than by catchphrases his economic policy working hypothesis that market forces are more effective than public spending to boost demand.

The report is also honest in clearly explaining in the context of economic strategy that priority for investment and job creation after a lengthy period of slender profits will depend on a substantial redistribution to boost earnings on capital.

At the same time the report points out

Continued on page 7

January unemployment figure a post-war record

Unemployment in January reached a post-war record of 2,539,000, or 10.2 per cent. That was 190,300 more than in December, when unemployment stood at 9.5 per cent.

Josef Stingl of the Federal Labour Office, Nuremberg, attributed the deterioration to seasonal reasons. There were signs of improvement in the labour market and the economy had been on the mend since the New Year.

Growth of unemployment
Registered unemployed in the Federal Republic of Germany

Year	Registered unemployed
1972	246433
1975	1074217
1979	876137
1982	1833244
1983	2258235
1984	2250000 (estimated)

G 4973

There was, he said, a slight improvement in demand for labour. In January 91,500 new vacancies had been registered at labour exchanges, which was 25 per cent more than in January 1983.

Jobs were found for 107,300 people, leaving a balance of 70,000 vacancies unfilled, which was 13 per cent more than last year.


The number of workers registered as working short shifts was 51,800 up on December at 565,000, due mainly to the building trades.

Last year and the year before, the Nuremberg agency said, there was a much higher increase in unemployment in January.

Between December 1982 and January 1983 unemployment increased by 263,700. A year earlier the increase was 245,000. The previous unemployment record, 2,536,000, was set up in February 1983.

Government and Opposition in Bonn have different views on rising unemployment. Christian and Free Democrats refer mainly to seasonal reasons and the promising outlook for the year ahead. Social Democrats say there is nothing to justify the government's optimism.

dpa
(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 3 February 1984)



▪ BUSINESS

The resurgence of the suggestion box

Christ und Welt
Rheinischer Merkur

Tinkering round in leisure time by telecommunications worker Kurt Hügle paid off for both him and his employee, the Bundespost, the Federal postal authority.

He developed a system of using a special team to trace faulty components in teleprinter circuits.

The Bundespost saves a million marks a year because of it and Hügle was rewarded with a payment of more than 56,000 marks.

This is an outstanding example. But it is not typical for the public service. Though there are about 305,000 employees in the Bundespost, in 1982 there were only 4,350 suggestions for improvements.

About 1,300 of them were rewarded with cash, certificates, stamp collections, or the honour of a lunch with the Minister of Post and Telegraphs.

But now the Bundespost is to try and follow industry and give its suggestion box system a shake-up. The man in charge of the project is Werner Gleissner, who represents the minister in this area.

More than 600,000 copies of a brochure urging employee to think about their workplace occasionally during leisure hours have been produced.

Financial incentives have also been planned with a payment equivalent to 10 per cent of the annual saving of any proposition that is acted upon. Maximum reward will be 100,000 marks.

The importance of ideas from employees was recognised as long ago as 1872 by industrialist Alfred Krupp. He issued instructions that suggestions be encouraged.

Since there has hardly another practice as firmly established in modern management as the suggestion box.

Despite this, the system has not been used to its full potential, says Norbert Thom, a member of the board of consultants Gesellschaft für Organisation, *in Giessen.*

However, there is no shortage of success stories from larger firms using the system. For example, IBM Deutschland has paid out bonuses of four million marks for schemes which have saved them 14 million marks.

Carl Freudenberg KG, in Weinheim, suppliers to the motor industry, say that the cost of setting up their system was clawed back within six months.

Fritz Ziegler, board member of Ruhrkohle AG, also believes in the suggestion box system because he believes that the success of a business depends on the willingness of its employees. It is an ideal way, he says, of learning cooperation.

The suggestion box system, he says, is a method through which management can motivate and inform employees about what is happening in the works, a way of getting them involved and of convincing them that their opinions are both wanted and useful.

In most companies, an independent assessor plus a panel drawn from various groups in the business itself decide on the merit of suggestions and the size of the rewards. The terms by which these decisions are reached are often clearly defined in in-house agreements.

Propositions must be presented as precisely as possible to show how costs can be cut, jobs safeguarded, the firm's prestige increased or the environment protected.

Rewards are made normally when there are direct results at the workplace. Otherwise there must be some outstanding development over and above the requirements of the job.

Thom says the strategic long-term policies must be developed to avoid the suggestion-box system degenerating.

Ziegler says the aim with Ruhrkohle for a long time have not merely been increases in productivity and efficiency.



Brochure display urging staff to submit ideas.
(Photo: Wolf-Dieter Köhler)

Suggestion boxes were a way of finding talent. Workers could be given more demanding tasks to suit their skills and they could win promotion and sent for further training.

Herbert Nowak, who is in charge of the suggestion box at Volkswagen AG in Wolfsburg, can hardly complain about lack of support from top management.

Chairman of the board Carl H. Hahn seldom misses the opportunity at staff meetings to push the suggestion-box system.

Between January and September last year, VW rewarded 7,280 suggestions with bonuses totalling almost nine million marks. This was nearly as much as in the whole of 1982.

Foremen at VW are obliged personally to make the fraternal request to workers to "think of something" as they hand out suggestion forms.

Beyond that, Nowak in general terms has a programme designed to develop ways of getting ideas from the workforce.

Every suggestion is given a tangible reward, regardless of whether it is likely to be put into action or not. As an example of the company's style, it gave out candlesticks last October to the 14,000 women on the staff as an advance for any ideas that might be thrown up.

Another promotional trick is regular lottery prizes; portable stereo sets, bicycles, kitchen appliances and even holidays are offered and won.

To keep the pot boiling, IBM management aims at the "sporting instincts" of the staff. Each month the number of suggestions are toted up and the department with the most gets the winner's cup.

Pens and pencils with the slogan "Don't get Angry, Suggest How Things Can Be Improved," are constant reminders of the programme.

That is one reason why computer manufacturers, with around 7,000 employees, get suggestions from about 28 per cent of their staff. By contrast, the electronic industry figure is nine per cent. The figure for industry as a whole is even lower, seven per cent.

The signs are good that these figures will get better. Janina von Glowacki, suggestion-box authority at the Deutschen Institut für Betriebswirtschaft, is convinced that the idea is gaining ground.

A hundred and seventy firms with a combined payroll of almost three million have made contact at the institute to exchange ideas. Specialist magazines report on what the various firms are doing.

Already there are innovators who think that rather than paying employees for ideas, that new forms of group work are a better form of motivation.

The works newspaper *EHD-Echo*, of mechanical engineering group Klöckner-Humboldt-Deutz AG (KHD) in Cologne, asked workers for suggestions about bringing into gear their specialist knowledge. Group work, suggests the paper, would have a reciprocal effect on encouraging ideas.

Group thinking is certainly an essential part of Japanese strategy and is gaining more adherents in Germany.

August Räubinger
(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, 27 January 1984)

Continued from page 6

that this need not be the case for more than a limited period.

Against the background of an economic report that does not deny the risk of recovery taking a turn for the worse the government can fairly claim the right to appeal to the parties to collective bargaining not to block the road to growth by a fresh avalanche of costs.

In doing so it is merely complying with its constitutional duty to provide guidelines for all sectors of society.

Hans D. Barbier
(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 3 February 1984)

■ RESOURCES

Bonn still holding fire on Law of the Sea convention

Frankfurter Allgemeine

The Law of the Sea Conference ended a year ago, but Bonn still hasn't made up its mind whether to sign the convention.

In legal terms, a convention does not become binding until it has been ratified.

But in the case of the Law of the Sea Convention legal and political circumstances could make it impossible to sustain the strict distinction between signing and ratifying.

As a result, even the decision on whether to sign or not calls for a provisional evaluation of whether the subsequent ratification should be recommended to the Bundestag.

Bonn has kept a close watch in the past few months on its foreign partners and their decisions.

These months have also given Bonn a chance to watch the work of the preparatory commission (prepcom), the body that is preparing the implementation of the Convention on behalf of all the signatories.

The major elements that will govern the ultimate decision are beginning to emerge.

Even now there is no legal pressure on Bonn because it has until December to sign and join the Convention.

But there are tactical reasons for taking a definite stand because Germany is seen as significant factor in determining the Convention's fate.

If Bonn wants to influence the further course of events it will soon have to make up its mind.

It is easier today than it was only two years ago to evaluate the Conference from Germany's point of view.

The question as to the propriety of the sweeping rights the Convention grants coastal nations has been defused.

Many countries have in the past few years done anyway what is provided for in the Convention. This means that the expansion of territorial and economic zones is already internationally accepted and has become part of customary law.

But important questions like the further development of this customary law remain open.

Still, none of these issues concern German interests to the point where they should have a major bearing on Bonn's decision.

This argument that the future development of the Law of the Sea can be orderly only if subject to a formal convention carries no great weight.

As in other areas of international law, here, too, the law of usage can become an effective instrument of international relations. This applies even — or indeed particularly — when the interests of the countries concerned are at variance.

All this points to the fact that the major aspect in assessing the Convention is not so much the rights of the coastal nations but the regulations governing deep-sea mining.

Here, the Convention has actually come up with new laws that are binding only for countries that have ratified it.

The developing nations claim that this is not so. But they are wrong.

The extremely high cost of deep-sea mining as provided for by the Convention has made its adoption by the Western industrial countries important — for financial if for no other reasons.

From a German point of view, the Convention's deep-sea mining provisions are negative. They violate the free market principles to which Germany owes its post-war affluence and which have guided Bonn's foreign trade policy.

Deep-sea mining would of necessity be centrally planned, protectionist and bureaucratic.

The provisions on the transfer of technology to the international authority to be set up for this purpose and to interested developing countries are a novelty in terms of international laws on ownership.

The strict provisions on the limitation of mining quotas are based on the one-sided and short-term interests of a few countries.

The establishment and the functioning of the International Seabed Authority and Enterprise as part of it is based on a concept that would replace orderly competition by central planning.

Moreover, the Convention replaces legal security by the principle of majority decision without protection for minorities: a review conference will have the right to amend the Convention with a 75 per cent majority.

All these restrictions of freedoms are familiar. But the rekindled discussion of the Convention is reason enough to highlight them again.


The Third World regards the deep-sea mining provisions as a model for a new international economic order.

It would be short-sighted and unrealistic not to take this challenge to our free trade based economic order seriously.

The current efforts by the Third World to change the system of international economic relations make the decision on future deep-sea mining an acid test of economic steadfastness for the Western industrial nations.

So the negative assessment of the Convention has nothing to do with whether German industry wants to give deep-sea mining priority or not.

Bonn's decision on the Convention will have to take into account foreign policy as well as strictly economic considerations.



The positions of the various Western European countries differ. Half of the European Community members have decided to sign the Convention. This speaks neither for nor against Bonn signing it.

But the situation changes when the Third World is taken into account. As was to be expected, many African, Asian and Latin American countries signed the Convention last year. In their view, nations that oppose the Convention lack solidarity and are uncooperative.

The Soviet Union has already capitalised on this and now publicly promotes the Convention, presenting itself as a partner of the Third World.

This makes it obvious that Bonn's efforts to improve relations with the Third World would be set back if it rejected the Convention.

On the other hand, a decision in favour would put a considerable strain on Bonn's relations with Washington because the USA rejects it.

Even though Washington has repeatedly changed its view of the Convention and could do so again, Bonn's deciding in favour of it would be full of problems. It has no choice but to take realities within the Alliance into account.

It is thus obvious that not all foreign policy considerations governing a pro or con decision point in the same direction. But right now Alliance considerations speak against signing.

There is also a practical element that has nothing to do with economic or foreign policy.

One of the main arguments of those in favour of signing is that only thus could Bonn influence the Preparatory Commission's work on deep-sea mining. But this standpoint has so far had no concrete effect.

Bonn has observer status on the Preparatory Commission. Even though it has no vote, it can coordinate its interests with those of France or Japan, both of whom are voting members.

The way the voting functions, Bonn would in any event have no major influence. This was amply demonstrated during the Conference itself.

What matters is that the Preparatory Commission is free to make decisions on individual issues but must essentially stick to the framework of the Convention and the principles on which it rests.

It is unrealistic to assume that the basic privisions of the Convention can more easily be modified through cooperation in the Commission than through a concerted alliance initiative.

There is also the fact that legal experts differ on whether the mere signing of the Convention makes deep-sea mining subject to its provisions or whether it is ratification that prevents the independent exploitation of the seabed.

Both sides have sound arguments. France, for instance, holds that deep-sea mining should be governed by both national law and the Convention.

But the opposite legal view to the effect that signing the Convention narrows the legal scope for future deep-sea mining is also sound.

What matters here is that the Western industrial countries, including Japan, are trying to reach an agreement that would serve as a basis for a future common law of the sea policy for themselves.

Under these circumstances, the argument that German interests are best protected by signing the Convention can no longer play a decisive role. On the contrary.

One could nevertheless argue that signing would enable Germany to take a constructive part in the many efforts to promote an international order through negotiations and strengthening international organisations.

The Law of the Sea Conference was the most sweeping post-war attempt to restructure a particularly important aspect to international relations through orderly negotiation.

A failure of the Conference could also weaken international efforts to settle conflicts.

This aspect will have to be weighed against those that speak against the Convention.

It should also be taken into account that the Conference began its work with such lofty ideals as the realisation of man's heritage and then deteriorated into a process aimed at preserving and distributing power.

Protection of minorities, universal conciliation of interests and just play justice became secondary.

Rudolf Dolzer

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 11 February 1984)

■ MOTORING

Tests reveal dangers of stress at the wheel

Stress is dangerous for drivers. It can lead to mistakes and crashes.

Even rally drivers suffer from stress in certain situations, as has been shown in trials at the Ford proving ground in Lommel, Belgium.

The tests were commissioned by a German road safety organisation.

Traffic psychologist Professor Gerhard Stöcker of Würzburg University used 10 specially developed devices to measure the reactions, concentration, dexterity and tension of both rally drivers and learners.

Measurements were taken before, during and after a difficult test run to check the physical and mental strain they underwent.

There were four test drivers and the run was over a distance of about 25km, or 15 miles. Before the run their readings were all normal.

Tests included tricky exercises in which they had to react with hands and feet to coloured lights and sounds. In these tests, carried out before the run, the performances of rally drivers and learners did not differ strikingly.

But during the test run and afterwards the figures differed considerably.

The pros were a 34-year-old rally and Formula 2 racing driver and a 25-year-old woman who is a rally cup-holder.

The amateurs were an 18-year-old schoolgirl who had held a licence for six weeks and a 19-year-old student with three months' driving practice.

The test run was far from easy, with fast sections, dangerous bends and gradients of up to one in three. But there was no time limit set.

The pros took about 15 minutes to go round the course. The learners, driving the same cars, Ford Orions, took between 26 minutes and half an hour.

A skin resistance measuring device attached to two finger-ends registered tension throughout, and both groups showed clear signs of stress.

The adrenalin output that mobilises energy in tricky situations invariably triggers readiness to act. The pros showed immediate signs of action aimed at concentrating on their driving.

The middle brain had activated hormones that prompted them to drive to the utmost of their ability.

This heightened readiness to act led the inexperienced learner drivers to feel extra scared and ready to make a getaway.

The 18-year-old girl in particular at times seriously misjudged her handling of the wheel, failed to spot trouble on bends in time and crashed her gears in a way that made her co-driver break out in cold sweat.

She frankly admitted after the test run that she had grossly overestimated her own ability, whereas the 19-year-old boy was clearly more experienced and showed greater self-possession and presence of mind.

His post-run ratings were much better than hers. He drove a family saloon regularly in town and on the autobahn. Both had driven the test run once before. Both said they were a little excited and tense, but not afraid.

In tests after the run Professor Stöcker was surprised to find that all four were much slower to react to optical and acoustic stimuli, a sign of tiredness.

Since this response was registered after driving for only about 20 minutes it was not difficult to imagine what it might be after driving much further.

Finger-end tension was found to vanish almost immediately after the run with the rally drivers, whereas it continued for up to 20 minutes with the learners.

A further surprise was that manual gears, as used by the rally drivers, generated twice as much stress as cars with an automatic gearbox.

His advice to learners is to get all the practice they can. Practice alone will reduce stress that is converted into fear.

Practice on busy roads seems to make them feel even more worried, so training on proving grounds might be a suitable alternative.

Autogenic training is another way of fighting stress. The road safety organisation has made up a relaxation cassette designed by Professor Stöcker to help ease tension at the wheel.

It results in relief of muscle tension, more even breathing, lower blood pressure. All the exercises can be carried out only at home or in the parking lot, of course, and not at the wheel.

Heidelberg social medic Hans Schäfer lists heart attacks as typical stress complaints, but he also mentions crashes by learner drivers with fatal consequences.

They are overburdened by the stress of driving, make mistakes, crash and die. The result is a drastic decline in life expectancy.

Professor Stöcker's tests have now shown for the first time how serious the effect of stress on road-users really is.

Joachim M. Strampp

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 4 February 1984)



Road-side matinee

First the drive, then the film. A driving school in Düsseldorf has introduced this video system so the pupil can go through the lesson again with the help of a film from a video camera mounted on the back seat. (Photo: AP)

Drunken driving continues to kill

STUTTGARTER NACHRICHTEN

Drunken driving costs the country nearly DM5.9bn a year.

The number of road accidents in which people are killed, maimed and crippled for life has increased steeply in the past 10 years.

One road death in four last year was due to driving under the influence of alcohol. The police, courts, doctors and psychologists may warn us not to look on drunken driving as a pardonable offence, but such warnings often fall on deaf ears.

The number of first offenders caught is on the increase, but up to 60 per cent are previous offenders, and the ones that get away are an even higher percentage than in other instances.

Surveys have shown that most German motorists have scanty knowledge of the connection between drinking and blood alcohol count and the effect of alcohol on road safety.

Many overestimate their personal ability to handle their drink or rely on miracle cures that are claimed to make you sober.

Yet scientists have clearly shown that such remedies are ineffective. All they can do is make the alcohol take longer to get into the blood.

The time it takes for alcohol to enter the bloodstream, and the amount that finds its way there, don't just depend on the quantity of alcohol consumed.

Mental and physical factors are at least as important. Healthy, well-fed drinkers who take their time will take longer to get drunk than sick, tired people who drink fast or on an empty stomach.

Frame of mind can affect the effect of alcohol for better or for worse. So in different ways, and unnoticed, people reach the stage at which they are no longer fit to drive.

A Waiblingen judge, Herr Hunecke, has said it would be wrong to equate unfitness to drive with being drunk. He is associated with a campaign against drinking and driving.

The law on drunken driving that has been in force for the past 10 years, he says, does not specify blood alcohol counts at which motorists are unfit to drive.

It merely says that a level of 80 milligrams of alcohol per decilitre of blood is an offence for which a fine must be imposed.

Supreme Court rulings indicate that unfitness to drive may occur at a level of 30 milligrams.

The present arrangement may be criticised for being obscure, yet all drivers know that offenders with between 80 and 129 milligrams are liable to a fine and maybe a driving ban.

Drunken drivers with a higher alcohol count are guilty of a criminal offence and invariably face a driving ban.

Schnapps, beer or wine are a matter of personal taste, but whatever the reason for drinking them, for your own interest and that of everyone else you would be well advised not to drive after drinking any alcohol at all.

Michael N. Lezsak

(Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 28 January 1984)

Too many road signs, and that's dangerous

Traffic court judges at their annual congress in Goslar have agreed there are far too many signs cluttering up the roadside in the Federal Republic of Germany.

The growing number of road signs was not just pointless; it could be dangerous.

In Frankfurt, for instance, statisticians have worked out that road-users have to come to terms with an average half dozen signs every 100 metres.

Surveys have long shown that there are strict limits to the number of stimuli the motorist can register. Such findings were quoted in Goslar by Cologne psychologist Edgar Spoerer.

Most people, he said, could register and comprehend two road signs at once, but they usually had to pass when it came to three or four or more.

The experts in Goslar said there were three main reasons why more and more signs have been put up with each passing year:

- Germans had a tendency to favour perfect optical regulation of traffic;
- there was increasing pressure on local authorities to put signs up to warn motorists of accident black spots and the like;
- the authorities were afraid of being made liable for neglect of their duty to warn road-users.

The law says that warning signs indicating, say, a bend, need only be put up if a motorist unfamiliar with the road could not possibily, even driving with all due care, anticipate the hazard ahead.

Yet in fact thousands of harmless bends anyone can see clearly on local and trunk roads are plastered with warning signs and speed limits.

The authorities usually decide to err on the safe side, having occasionally been found partly to blame for a motorist driving into a ditch.

The motorist argued in court that the accident spot was so dangerous there ought to have been a road sign to warn him.

The court agreed, ruling that the local authority was partly to blame for the

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■ THE CINEMA

Director Gremm: a craftsman's pride

Film director Wolf Gremm never imagined that one day his work would be reviewed by no less a person than Bavarian Prime Minister Franz Josef Strauss.

Herr Strauss wrote to the director-general of Sender Freies Berlin after watching an episode in the *Tatort* crime series entitled *Tod im U-Bahnschacht*, or Death in a Subway Tunnel.

It dealt with slave trading in migrant workers and was a bandit film featuring scenes from a brothel that might have been shot in Montevideo, Strauss wrote.

Gremm has little patience with comments along these lines. Such misunderstandings, he says, always arise when people believe they are shown reality on the TV screen.

"I lay no claim whatever to reality. TV, like the cinema screen, is merely a shop window people have dressed to suit their taste.

"What you see is a strictly personal view of reality, *my* view. I would like the aesthetic means in my films to deliberately clash with reality. That is one of the laws of film-making."

This is the view he would like to be taken of his TV film *Hinter der Tür* (Behind the Door), an easily understood horror film screened by ZDF a while ago.

By the time it was half-way through viewers had a shrewd idea what was going to happen. There were no subtle horrors along the lines of the late Alfred Hitchcock.

But Gremm had never intended imitating Hitchcock. His aim is somewhat different. "As a director," he says, "you are at the mercy of a made-to-measure landscape within which you can move around with no great danger.

"But in the long run it is too boring. That is why I am happy to run risks by doing things aimed at taking the viewer by surprise.

"There are, of course, traditions in respect of what is to be found in these borderline areas. There are antecedents."

He never stays too long in this danger zone, however. Why should he rub his viewers up the wrong way?

That is why he agrees to some extent with Bonn Interior Minister Friedrich Zimmermann's new regulations on grants to film-makers:

"We want feedback from our viewers, surely. So we can't afford to work in a way that passes them by."

Economic considerations are something he respects, maybe because his producer is ever-present. He has been married to Regina Ziegler, one of the country's most successful women film producers, for six years.

Is making films easier when you live with your producer? "That," he says, "is what they all think. In reality it is much more difficult." He will not be drawn further on this point.

He was born in 1942 in Freiburg and was one of the first generation of graduates of the Berlin Film and TV Academy.

After a few short films his first success was a 1971 TV film on the drug scene entitled *Der grosse Verschleiss* (The Great Wear and Tear).



Wolf Gremm . . . criticism from an unexpected source. (Photo: dpa)

He planned to make a second film about abuse of pills and tablets. It was also to have been produced by Sender Freies Berlin, but the station had second thoughts; the subject was felt to be too controversial.

He tried his hand at cinema films because he felt he might have greater leeway. His first full-length feature film, made in 1973, was entitled *Ich dachte, ich wäre tot* (I Thought I Was Dead).

It told the tale of a girl's difficulties in coming to terms with her surroundings. It was uniformly welcomed by the critics and won a Federal film award.

In the wake of more cinema films he returned to TV, directing the *Tatort* episode already mentioned and a ZDF film entitled *Die Schattengrenze* (The Shadow Border).

It deals with the decline and fall of a man who joins the ranks of the unemployed at the age of about 50.

His personal favourites include *Die Brüder* (The Brothers), 1976, and the film version of Erich Kästner's *Fabian*, 1980, which was nominated for a Oscar as the best foreign film.

What demands does he make on himself as a director? "Doing the job well is a moral obligation as I see it, a matter of a craftsman's pride, if you will.

"That, I feel, is an essential prerequi-

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Actress Gudrun Landgrebe varies her style

Gudrun Landgrebe, German cinemagoers were for once agreed, is a terrific woman. She was largely responsible for the box office success of Robert van Ackeren's *Die flambierte Frau* (La Femme Flambée).

It is a social satire rich in black humour that more than one million people have seen since the film was first networked last summer.

Many, if not most, will have paid to see Gudrun Landgrebe, an attractive woman and an outstanding actress.

From being relatively unknown as a stage and screen actress she gained virtually overnight acclaim as though she were Hollywood material.

That doesn't often happen in Germany, as she well knows, especially after being told frequently of late that she is another Romy Schneider.

She would doubtless sooner be the first Landgrebe than a second Schneider, but that may change. She is now working in Hungary.


It is a film directed by Istvan Szabo and starring Klaus Maria Brandauer as Col. Alfred Redl, an Austro-Hungarian general staff officer who spied for the Russians.

She is playing the female lead, and since Szabo made Brandauer an international star in *Mephisto* she will be hoping he can do it for her too.

She has already hit German headlines as the star of Burkhard Driest's *Annas Mutter* (Anna's Mother), the take of a courtroom drama given extensive media coverage in recent years.

Why did she agree to star in such a sensational potboiler? "I was totally fascinated by Driest's screenplay," she says.

"It told the tale of a woman who is extremely competent, a woman with desires and despair that I know well." And



Gudrun Landgrebe . . . prefers to avoid cliches. (Photo: ...)

as she always plays herself she was happy to take the part on.

She is unperturbed that another film on the same subject is being networked simultaneously in Germany. She is self-assured and sets great store by Driest's ability as a director.

Besides, she wanted to escape from the cliché of the film that made her name. Clichés are something she dislikes. She prefers less straightforward roles that force her to take a closer look at herself.

Both on the screen and on the stage, she says, the days when young girls were favoured are over, and a good thing too.

Whether she was right to play the part of Marianne Bachmeier in *Annas Mutter* remains to be seen. Stars come and go, as screen history shows.

Margarete von Schwarzkopf

(Die Welt, 5 January 1984)

Commuting from one world to another

Federal film award-winner Helma Sanders has finished shooting in Berlin for her new film *Flügel und Fesseln* (German title: Wings and Fetters). She is now on location in Normandy.

It will be the first film starring Hildegard Knef for some time. It tells the tale of a woman's clash with her biography.

Her daughter in the film is played by French star Brigitte Fossey, who was discovered as a child in *Forbidden Games*. Other parts are played by Ivan Desny and Hermann Treusch, a popular actor at the Schiller-Theater in Berlin.


Brigitte Fossey, who has previously starred in *The Glass Cell*, *The Man Who Loved Women* and *Quintet*, plays an actress in whose life reality and a dream world intermingle.

"The story told in my film," Frau Sanders says, "is part of my own biography. It is a matter of the way we feel, of wanting to fly away and change yet remain curious about changes.

"It is also about being fettered, by people, by things, by one's surroundings, by everyday life.

"The film deals with a woman who is an actress. On the one hand she is a star who lives in a make-believe world. But she also has a little daughter for whom she is responsible.

"Besides, she has her own private life. She has a brief love affair with her partner in connection with a film they are both working on.



Helma Sanders . . . admiration for Hildegard Knef. (Photo: Rabau)

"So her private life is mixed up with her career. My film is intended to make it clear how difficult life is for people who commute between this artificial world and their real world."

Brigitte Fossey was the actress Frau Sanders wanted for the part from the outset. They made each other's acquaintance as members of the Berlin Film Festival's international jury.

They agreed to work together as soon as possible. Frau Sanders hired Sacha Vierny, the French cameraman who shot *Hiroshima, mon amour* and *Last Year in Marienbad* for Alain Resnais.

Hildegard Knef now lives in Los Angeles. The director had a lengthy personal talk with her and persuaded her to play the part of the actress's mother.

In the film she plays a Berlin woman who is married to a Frenchman in Normandy. He is Ivan Desny, her 19[illegible] partner in *Geständnis unter vier Augen* (German title: Private Confession).

Jürgen Knieper has composed a song for Frau Knef, a tribute to Berlin, that she will be singing in the film.

In engaging Hildegard Knef the director is paying homage to an artist she holds in great esteem.

"I have great admiration for Hildegard Knef and would like to make this clear in her part. I greatly admire what she has accomplished in her life, and she is still one of the few German world stars.

"What is more, she has never baulked at running a risk and has always retained an open mind on change."

Bernd Lubowski

(Hamburger Abendblatt, 6 February 1984)

■ THE ARTS

Play reveals gloom, but through the cliches

Furcht und Hoffnung der BRD (Fear and Hope in the FRG), Franz Xaver Kroetz's latest play about life in the Federal Republic, paints a gloomy picture.

People are unemployed, lonely, deformed, pretending. A 56-year-old accounts clerk plans to pour fuel over himself and go up like a torch over Christmas.

An unemployed man sitting on a park bench tells the woman sitting next to him he is a police officer observing suspects.

A young man shares his lonely private life with a shop-window dummy. This, Kroetz says, is everyday life in the Federal Republic in 1983.

It surely is pretty wretched, a kind of ice age. In one of the 15 scenes a woman dreams she has a bloodstained icicle between her legs.

"Dreaming against the cold," her husband suggests. "Go on living? Between ice and petrol?" she asks. She wants neither to burn nor to die of cold.

That is the basic tenor of the play, its feeling of life, its view of reality. The title is borrowed from Brecht. The play has been premiered in Bochum and Düsseldorf.

People whose personal experiences are different will naturally find it hard to come to terms with the play, and there is also the fundamental issue of whether the theatre is the right place to pinpoint this sort of thing.

I tend to feel it isn't. TV can provide a much more direct view of reality. On the stage it tends to be even more elevated and didactic.

Opinion and agitation come to the fore, especially as Kroetz has again assembled all the clichés usually associated with a critical portrayal of the Federal Republic.

The inevitable Turkish migrant worker is there, as is the tabloid daily *Bild-Zeitung*. Fascist trends are as much in evidence as oppression of women.

Kroetz embodies the very feeling of life that intellectuals in the Federal Republic feel to be good form.

Yet he is undeniably a talented playwright. In his observation of the petty bourgeoisie he succeeds time and again in depicting scenes full of explosive ambivalence.

Kroetz well knows that two diametrically opposed basic views can exist side by side in the petty bourgeois soul. One is the feeling of charity or solidarity, the other a sense of pride.

They can be voiced by the same person from one moment to the next. Awareness is governed by the need of the moment, Kroetz knows what people are like, how interchangeable everything can be.

That ought really to make him mistrustful of his own conclusions.

Kroetz cannot be equated with Brecht. he is much more naturalist and less ideological, and also less anarchic in his basic feelings.

But that has its drawbacks. In Brecht even difficult situations retain a whisper of inner momentum. Negation keeps people on the move, and ideology behaves as though it might be able to get things moving.

Kroetz, in contrast, is somehow bleak and desolate. The wife of a writer who has written nothing for months "out of fear" says: "Write at least that you are afraid of fear." "And make myself suspicious?" he replies.

Theatre could hardly be gloomier, which is a great pity because Kroetz's dry irony can be much more effective: "A trade union only makes sense when you have a job. Have you ever seen an unemployed man on strike?"

Horst Siede, the Bochum director, has emphasised this strong point of the playwright's. He doesn't add to the depression and anxiety as Peter Palitzsch in Düsseldorf does.

Siede has commissioned a clear, lucid and practical set from designer Michel G. Peter that allows the individual scenes room to breathe.

High, bare walls and a window very high up are oppressive without hemming people in, and the scenes are always limited to small sections of the wide stage, demonstrating isolation without confining the action.

Siede's directing is clear and to the point, with no monkey business. He makes his audience burst out laughing, then hits back doubly hard.

His images are comical and bitter at the same time. An unemployed man, for instance, is sitting at a crooked table on a crooked chair wearing pyjamas, hiking boots and a huntsman's hat.

'Furcht und Hoffnung,' Kroetz's version as it was presented in Bochum. (Photo: Thomas Eichhorn)

But the table and chair are not crooked by virtue of age and decrepitude. The perspective is askew. The Bochum production is one that can be seen even if you aren't a Kroetz aficionado.

Peter Palitzsch's Düsseldorf production of the play is another matter. The stage looks like a junk shop. Herbert Kapplmüller's set is invariably in the way.

Palitzsch has trouble getting his cast on and off the stage. He messes everything up. he dovetails the scenes, playing one particular one whenever the scene is being reset.

As an experienced Brecht director he can only have taken leave of his senses. Inappropriate means are used, a choir for instance that sings a Christmas carol on the overcrowded stage and can then only with difficulty be got off it.

The acting is embittered, no-one laughs, and there is an atmosphere of neurotic self-upset that makes Kroetz intolerable.

Lothar Schmidt-Mühlisch

(Die Welt, 30 January 1984)

Encounters of an artist's third dimension

Italian artist Lucio Fontana added a new dimension to the arts in the 1950s with holes in his paintings and cuts in the canvas.

In what at the time was a revolutionary move he suddenly showed just what lay behind the canvas: space.

His spatial art burst the bounds of illusionist painting that sought on a two-dimensional plane to create the impression of the third dimension.

A quarter of a century ago his work created an uproar. Now, in retrospect, it looks competent and kempt at the Fontana exhibition in the Munich Haus der Kunst.

The Milan iconoclast, as he was called, can be seen to have gone about his work prudently and aesthetically.

His cuts and blows are delivered as tellingly as though a surgeon skilled in wielding his scalpel had playfully decided to demonstrate his skill.

Fontana's 'La Luna a Venezia.' (Photo: Catalogue)

Fontana did not aim primarily to shock people. What fascinated him was that by cutting the canvas a formal happening could be achieved without either brush or paint, yet with amazing effect.

Depending how the canvas is stretched the cut edges are either concave or convex, giving the space behind the canvas a depth suggestive of suction.

He was born in 1899 in Buenos Aires, first worked as an engineer, then in his father's studio (his father was a sculptor).

At the age of 30 he studied at the Milan Academy of Art, embarking on a second career in abstract ceramics. It was not until after the Second World that he discovered what was to be his forte: spatial art. In 1949 he exhibited his first total environment at the Naviglio Gallery in Milan. It was later to trigger an entire movement. This remarkable "space" is exactly reconstructed at the Munich exhibition. The room is completely dark. After trying to get your bearings you see an object. It seems to be hanging in mid-air, is multicoloured, abstract, rampant and consists of magically reflecting bars, wires and surfaces illuminated by an ultra-violet light.

It was an early premiere for cosmic fantasy, light and life in total darkness, an intoxicating installation.

Alongside what, sad to say, was his only total work of art you could walk into, he began to cut his first canvases.

In keeping with the spirit of the times they were covered in thick, pasty smears of paint, covered in the tachiste manner or roughened up in relief with sand, soil, stones and pieces of glass.

Yet fairly independently of the backgrounds his incisions score out delightful patterns like star traces. At times his rows of holes also resemble the holes on dressmakers' patterns, are decorative exercises.

Only in 1963, five years before he died, did he further intensify his experiments with holes. His paintings are oval and he cuts the surface to ribbons.

The edges open up like scars or craters. The patterns are no longer orderly; they are wild and impetuous. One is reminded of the impact of meteorites.

At times the cuts, small and large, are so close together as to be suggestive of bombfields. Fontana named this series The End of God.

Contemporary critics saw his art as the end of painting. That was exaggerated, as present-day art proves.

The Munich exhibition amply demonstrates that Fontana was a painter, even though he may not have used conventional means.

He was an epic painter, covering the entire range of heights and depths.

Peter M. Bode

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 25 January 1984)

■ EDUCATION

Catching up with US, Japan: dispute over plan for private high-tech universities

The idea of setting up private universities in the Federal Republic of Germany was not, by any stretch of the imagination, first mooted by Foreign Minister Genscher.

Herdecke in the Ruhr already has a private university with its first intake of medical students and has gone in for new ideas in student selection and teaching methods.

Herdecke is an experiment that has been widely acclaimed. In Koblenz, on the Rhine, the chamber of commerce and industry is setting up a three-language school of business studies.

It is to be financed by donations from industry and by charging students a fee of DM4,000 per semester.

Herr Genscher has now suggested setting up foundations to endow private university colleges specialising in high tech.

His idea is to help German industry bridge the gap between it and firms in the United States and Japan in, say, microelectronics and bioengineering.

At an international Aspen conference on American and European universities held in West Berlin it now transpires that Herr Genscher's high-tech private universities are not to be financed exclusively by private means.

A medium-sized university, as Dr Konrad Seitz, head of planning at the Foreign Office, admitted, costs between DM250m and DM300m a year to run.

DER TAGESSPIEGEL

Herr Genscher, he said, envisages industry and scientific foundations endowing the new universities with funds. Students' parents would pay the fees if they could afford them. The state would pay what was left.

It remained to be seen, the Aspen conference having failed to clarify the matter, whether what was left would in fact be the bulk of expenditure.

This was the point at which university experts began to express misgivings. German experts first referred to a resolution by the Prime Ministers of the *Länder* in 1977.

The *Land* Premiers had agreed to throw universities open to the influx of high birth-rate years as young people in this age group would otherwise never stand a chance of learning a trade.

The universities, which had long been suffering from overcrowding, were reluctant but tempted by an undertaking to hire extra teaching staff to cater for the extra intake.

This extra was put at well over 200,000 new students per semester, as against a more normal figure of 155,000.

But then came a slump and cuts in university spending. Little or no extra cash was forthcoming, certainly not in amounts that made planning possible.

Grants for extra teaching staff were made by the semester, whereas the problem of high student intake at university is one that will last well into the 1990s.

Vice-chancellors of conventional universities are unlikely to welcome any suggestion of government funds being made available to private universities when existing universities are starved of cash.

Besides, German universities cannot agree that their standards are so poor they cannot be entrusted with top-flight research.

This point was strongly made by the representatives of the Standing Conference of West German University Vice-Chancellors, Professors Berchem and Seidel.

German universities, they said, were generally good, although not necessarily in all departments.

Private universities such as so far existed, the medical school in Herdecke and the school of business studies in Koblenz, could only be described as university departments, not as full universities.

Hopes placed in privately endowed colleges as elite training facilities were too high. They couldn't possible live up to some politicians' expectations.

Professor Seidel, a chemist, said it was wildly romantic to hope to set up private elite universities in the space of five or six years.

Teams of scientists in the natural sciences in whom such expectations were placed needed time to develop organically, at least 15 years, he felt.

The representative of a leading scientific foundation agreed that it took decades to build up a good university. This could be seen from the fact that only two of the rash of new universities set up in the 1960s and 1970 had so far really soundly established themselves.

Widespread surprise

So stimuli for top-flight research and teaching should be sought within the state university system.

There was widespread surprise when the representatives of private universities in the United States that are constantly referred to as exemplary in Germany criticised Herr Genscher's proposals.

The president of Harvard, Derek Bok, said he was doubtful whether enough cash could be raised in donations in Germany to endow a private university.

He was equally sceptical about the possibility of launching any such university at speed. It would be more realistic to experiment more and ensure greater flexibility within the existing state framework.

This presupposed for one that university vice-chancellors and deans were given wider powers to engage in fresh research and experiments and to raise funds to finance them.

These experimental departments ought also to be entitled to select their own students and not be required to take what the university admissions bureau in Dortmund allocated them.

Professor Walter Rosenblith of the MIT suggested a five- or 10-year research programme in bioengineering in the Federal Republic, a sector in which the Germans had fallen behind Japan and the United States.

Bioengineering ought to be declared a special research sector at several universities collaborating in biology, agricultural science and chemistry.

Promotion of bioengineering ought not to be carried out on the dubious basis of new and private establishments. Germany had a fine tradition of technical universities. All that was needed was to get them to collaborate.

It was agreed at the conference that knowledge of new technologies had to extend in sufficient measure to pupils, teachers and adults to meet future requirements.

Education and Arts Senator Kewenig of West Berlin agreed with Eberhard Böning of the Bonn Education Ministry that the universities had a major role to play in adult education in the new technologies.

Courses must be offered at various levels and for varying periods, preferably modelled on the wide range of further education courses provided by leading American universities.

At Harvard, for instance, the 15,000 full-time students are joined by 45,000 adults who return to university for refresher courses.

Courses can be for 10 days, three months or up to a year. They can be extremely expensive for individual groups depending on length of course and interests.

Some are adults who want to improve their general education in the arts or philosophy. Diplomats or would-be politicians train with particular intensity for their future activities.

Executives who have so far specialised and now want to generalise go to the Harvard Business School. Others who have found out from experience how soon their knowledge is outdated or want to change jobs will also attend university courses.

There are no exams. Student motivation is felt to be enough — both at Harvard and at the MIT. Would-be executives come from all over the world to train in the United States rather than in Germany.

German universities, Professor Kewenig said, were lagging 20 years behind Harvard and the MIT because there was still a widespread belief in Germany that a trade was learnt for life.

In future people would change jobs two or three times in their working lives and universities would need to cater for refresher courses and fresh courses of study.

Professor Kewenig took the opportunity of airing a favourite idea of his, that of sending students out to work after three or four years at university (thereby substantially reducing the length of courses), then recalling them for refresher courses years later.

He felt universities could still combine mass training and training for an elite by making only second degrees comply with Humboldt's university requirement of old: the combination of teaching and research.


This brought the discussion round full circle. Senator Kewenig would prefer to provide elite facilities at the mass universities and not leave this field to private universities.

Uwe Schlicht

(Der Tagesspiegel, 3 February 1984)

■ NUMISMATICS

Island beach yields batch of mediaeval coins





Some of the Föhr coins. (Photos: Landesamt für Vor- und Frühgeschichte, Schleswig)

The beach of the North Sea island of Föhr has yielded the largest find of early mediaeval coins ever found outside their areas of origin, Southern England and Frisia.

They are sceattas, 82 of them, tiny silver discs with a hallmark that have surfaced at a particular point on the beach.

The last of them seem to have surfaced last summer. They are now being checked by an expert from the Museum of Hamburg History for the Schleswig-Holstein department of prehistory in Schleswig.

The name sceatta is Anglo-Saxon and means treasure. They are pieces of silver weighing between 0.8 and 1.4 grams, primitive coins dating back to the days just after the early mediaeval migrations.

They show no sign of where they were minted or who by. They come in no special weight or value.

They probably originated in Western Frisia, where in the early mediaeval period large trading centres flourished at Dorestad and Maastricht.

Some seem also to have come from the south of England, where troves of up to 800 or more sceattas have been found.

The Föhr find is the largest ever made outside the area they originate from. Several dozen sceattas have also been found in Ribe, north of the border in Denmark, not far from the North Sea coast.

The first Föhr finds appeared in 1976 when an amateur archaeologist from Brunswick was taking one of his regular walks at low tide.

He is a skilled amateur who patrols the beaches on his holidays in collaboration with the *Land* archaeology department in Schleswig.

Further finds were made, one by an archaeology student who took up archaeology on the strength of the Föhr treasure trove.

Another finder was a judge at a Hamburg magistrate's court. An official of the archaeology department tried his luck with a metal detector, but all he found was old beer cans and the like.

Finds did not continue in earnest until the seekers took to sieving the sand. But the 82 now found look likely to have been the lot.

They will have been washed out to sea when a Viking settlement was destroyed by the waves at this spot. They probably date to about 750 AD and were buried in a container.

We are unlikely ever to find out what value they had for their owner: whether they were for use in trading, a nest egg or the result of an early Viking foray.

Sceattas are both primitive and mysterious coins. They were minted at a time when government and order had reached a nadir in the aftermath of the great migrations.

When Rome fell, the system of mints and coins and weights and measures collapsed. The currency had already long been debased.

So old coins were used, or silver rings chopped up into pieces that were weighed on a balance.

Balances dating to this period have been widely found. They still work on the same principle and are accurate to within a hundredth of a gram.

Given this unsatisfactory state of affairs coins began to be minted irregularly, with no government guarantee or standard weight, for trading purposes.

They were struck where trade and the economy flourished and merchants were sick and tired of bartering and chopping up pieces of silver: along the southern reaches of the North Sea.

A kind of world trade went on there, with wool being imported from England and spun and woven into internationally acknowledged cloth qualities.

High-grade clay pots were made and sold, as were millstones made of Rhenish lava. All these goods were exported across the North Sea and far into the Baltic.

In return furs, slaves and other products not always readily available were imported from the underdeveloped countries to the north and east.

So in Frisia, where all this trading went on, there was a need for rationalisation of business by means of striking coins in the early mediaeval period.

Sceattas were the coins. No-one knows who minted them. As likely as not, merchants and guilds ordered mint silver from a private mint.

At all events, coins were struck that didn't have standard weights, so they had to be weighed like bit silver, but they bore a hallmark as a guarantee of silver content.

All sceattas so far found are between 70 and 80 per cent silver. They weigh about one gram and were thus easier to carry around and weigh than bit silver.

The hallmark was taken with a pinch of salt. Most of the Föhr sceattas have been scratched to see whether they are all silver or just lead or copper plated in silver.

Counterfeiting and debasing of the currency have a tradition dating back to the Ancient World.

Sceattas were anything but works of art, unlike Roman coins. They usually have stick figures that are virtually impossible to identify.

The porcupine type could be a portrait with spiky hair. It has also been interpreted as a depiction of Romulus and Remus with the she-wolf.

The standard type looks as though it might feature a flag. But it could be something else. Another type clearly shows a head and letters modelled on the appearance of Roman coins.

Others seem to depict a bird on a cross or a star of David. Another type, the Wotan and monster type, is missing entirely from the Föhr collection.

It could depict Wotan and Fenris the wolf, the hell's monster of the Icelandic sagas. Oddly enough, the finds further north, in Ribe, Denmark, consist entirely of Wotan sceattas.

This may mean the two troves are from different mints or, indeed, from different periods.

Large numbers of sceattas seem to have been struck. No two coins found in Föhr bear the same hallmark. There are plenty of porcupines, all similar but none identical.

Even if we assume that the unknown mints used hallmarks that soon wore out and had to be replaced, one run after another of these Anglo-Frisian coins seems to have been struck.

Struck to meet a need for trading in central and northern Europe, they were not replaced by proper coins until the Carolingian period.

It was then not long before Haithabu, a Viking settlement near Schleswig, began to mint its own coins.

But the sceattas, with their emblems that are a mixture of misunderstood Roman coins and Germanic ideas, still retain a charm of their own and are keenly collected.

Harald Steinert

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 3 February 1984)

Wolf Gremm

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me for success, and being successful means to me the opportunity of making my next film."

He is doing that right now. It deals with a Berlin construction scandal entailing losses totalling DM40m. There are intentional parallels with an affair that actual happened a few years ago.

Shooting is to begin in May, with Harald Juhnke starring as a roadsweeper. He is the male lead in what Gremm says will be a comedy.

Rainer Nolden

(Die Welt, 23 January 1984)

Road signs

Continued from page 9

accident. The authorities have decided that more signs are probably better.

The enormous number of signs, the congress was told, is dangerous in that it makes motorists less responsive to the signs that really matter.

The mass of signs prompt motorists to ignore them. "Fewer signs often mean greater road safety," said Hartmut Vogt of Frankfurt city council.

Any driver who passes four road signs that are a waste of time is likely to ignore the fifth one that is there for a good reason.

Action has been taken on a 35km section of trunk road in Austria where 50 per cent of road signs were taken down. A slight decline in the number of accidents was recorded in the first year after the roadside was cleared.

The Goslar congress felt local bodies ought to check German roads to see whether 15 or 25 per cent of road signs were superfluous.

Uwe Härtel

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 28 January 1984)

■ MODERN LIVING

Frau Strauss claims cartoon royalties

DIE ZEIT



Looking for a slice of the action . . . Frau Marianne Strauss. (Photo: Sven Simon)

The wife of Bavarian Prime Minister *Franz Josef Strauss is claiming* royalties from a Munich publisher of cartoon books featuring her husband.

"The books are undoubtedly amusing and contain many political allusions," she wrote just before Christmas to Süddeutscher Verlag, the publishers.

"But economically significant use is equally undoubtedly made of my husband, as the long print runs and the new paperback edition show.

"Economic use," she warned the publisher of Dieter Hanitzsch's cartoon books, "invariably involves payment of fees."

Süddeutscher Verlag can hardly deny having put the burly Bavarian Premier to profitable use. The three books of cartoons have sold over 100,000 copies.

Enough was enough, Marianne Strauss, an economics graduate, decided. "I would be most obliged," she wrote, "if you would remit royalties of 15 per cent to cover sales from 1981 to 1983".

The publishers took legal advice. The cartoonist initially couldn't believe it. Neither could cabaret stars Gerhard Polt and Dieter Hildebrandt.

They merely read the letter out loud to their audience at the Kammerspiele. Was it to be taken seriously? Hildebrandt said he could fully understand the Bavarian First Lady's worries.

After her Christmas shopping she must have been upset by the speed at which her housekeeping money seemed to vanish, he said.

But she stood to become a rich woman if all cabaret artistes had to pay her 15 per cent of the proceeds of jokes about Herr Strauss.

Polt said he felt she ought to consider giving clients three per cent discount as her husband's name was not the newest and might fairly be claimed to be slightly shopsoiled.

Cartoonists' reactions varied. Ernst Maria Lang of *Süddeutsche Zeitung* said he was first at a loss for words. Then he added that he was well aware greed, especially for money, was widespread.

But it was extremely interesting to learn that the Prime Minister's wife had fallen prey to it.

Gustav Peichl, the Viennese professor whose nom-de-plume is Ironimus, said he envied the people of Munich such a superb Fasching joke.

Gabor Benedek said he would be prepared to accept the idea of paying a politician royalties. The prospect of earning extra money on the side by being marketed by cartoonists would, he felt, prompt politicians to do even sillier things.

He had already made arrangements for Nancy Reagan, Mme Mitterrand and Denis Thatcher to have royalties credited to their accounts.

Luis Murschetz adds that since politicians achieve immortality via cartoons a politician's wife is now trying to jump on to the bandwaggon. But Frau Strauss, in his view, has bitten off more than she can chew in trying to outsmart Süddeutscher Verlag.

The publishers have replied saying they see no reason for remunerating the Prime Minister. They enclosed an expertise by Ferdinand Sieger, a Stuttgart expert on copyright law.

He says royalties could only be charged if a contemporary public figure were used to advertise a product, whereas cartoons form part of the freedom of opinion guaranteed by the constitution.

It is the Prime Minister's duty to defend constitutional rights, and equally so the duty of a publisher and newspaper proprietor like Süddeutscher Verlag.

Frau Strauss, who said she was prepared to take her case to the Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe if need be, has now asked people to appreciate her position.

Her husband is sent thousands of copies of Hanitzsch books before Christmas and requested to autograph them. His right arm had hurt badly after one such autograph session.

"Kind regards from an employer who isn't paid a dividend," he once wrote in a copy autographed for the author, Dieter Hanitzsch.


Frau Strauss now feels a gesture of some kind ought to be made, such as a donation to the Multiple Sclerosis Association, of which she is patron.

But at the bottom of her original letter she had written: Franz Josef Strauss, royalties account No. 2157 600, Deutsche Bank, Munich.

Dietrich Kühnel

(Die Zeit, 27 January 1984)

Why Germans emigrate to Australia



Germans who emigrate to Australia cannot expect a higher standard of living, better job prospects or even a better deal in welfare state terms, it is generally agreed.

So Professor Arthur Cropley and Folkert Lüthke of Hamburg University department of psychology are investigating the reasons why Australia still tops the list for Germans keen to emigrate.

According to statistics kept by a Bonn government department in Cologne 17,834 Germans emigrated to Australia between 1973 and 1982.

Many more have been keen to emigrate but been turned down by the Australian authorities, who have become much more selective.

The Hamburg research project is a long-term venture and not scheduled for completion until 1986, but interim findings convey a clear idea of what makes emigrants want to emigrate.

Their main motive is a feeling of dissatisfaction prompted, as they see it, by too much red tape, high taxes, high prices, a polluted environment, bad weather, too little room and fear of war.

Yet a group of people chosen for comparison were found, much to the Hamburg psychologists' surprise, to voice exactly the same criticism without considering emigrating as the answer.

This would seem to suggest that other, possibly psychological motives contribute toward the desire to emigrate.

Professor Cropley, who has lived and worked in the Federal Republic of Germany for 10 years, is an Australian. He and his associates began by interviewing applicants at the Australian immigration centre in Cologne.

They were interviewed individually and in groups. Then came two more sets of interviews involving 280 men and women.

In-depth interviews of 200 Germans on the point of emigrating to Australia were conducted. Once they have had time to get used to life over there they will be sent two more questionnaires at 12-month intervals.

Some have agreed to keep a diary of their impressions and experiences to provide additional documentation of how they get on as New Australians.

The Hamburg psychologists have suggested specific topics to be covered in these diaries, such as the language, accomodation, work, acclimatisation, home sickness, euphoria and depression.

The aim of the project, which is backed financially by the Scientific Research Association (DFG), is to find out whether there is a special type of person who is a likely prospect as an emigrant and to see how new immigrants get on in their first years abroad.

Project scientists hope they will then be better able to advise people considering emigrating and to prepare them for difficulties they are likely to encounter.

Gert Kistenmacher

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 1 February 1984)

More people are living alone

DER TAGESSPIEGEL

More and more people in Germany are living on their own. In 19[?] only three per cent of Germans were singles; by 1982 the figure was 13 per cent, says the Federal Demographic Institute, Wiesbaden.

Over this period the proportion of single-member households as a percentage of the total number increased from 10 to 30.

The trend has been particularly ma[?] since the Second World War, and is continuing.

A closer look has been taken at the figures since 1961 to see the extent to which changes are due to demographic factors and behaviour patterns.

A distinction was drawn between si-

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Life 'controlled by the clock'

Germans, unlike people in Africa, are slaves of time, says a black African pastor who has lived and worked in the Federal Republic of Germany for [?] years.

They live by the clock. It controls and dominates them. That is why they are always in a hurry. They no longer have time to be themselves, to be natural.

Africans see them as lifeless robots, writes Rev. Swarishang Mukgabo of the Lutheran Mission in Lower Saxony in an article summarising his experiences. He has now returned to South Africa.

Another point he noted with displeasure was that Western society is extremely materialistic in its entire outlook. Accumulation of wealth is felt to be the main aim in life, if not the only one.

He left Germany with three wishes for the Germans:

"We wish the rich Germans [?] poverty, but more time: not dependence but more "freedom in Christ"; not [?] times, but to learn to be grateful for what they have.

"We would also like them to learn to happily part company with a little of what they have."

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 18 January 19[?])

Suitcase gets free taxi ride

To the station, and step on it, [?] customer at a Frankfurt hotel [?] the taxi driver.

"OK," said the cabbie. "Chuck [?] case in the back and hang on." The [?] shut and off he drove.

He had almost reached the sta[?] before he noticed he hadn't got a pa[?]senger. There was only the suitcase [?] the back seat.

The passenger had closed the d[?] with the intention of getting in the f[?] alongside the driver. But the driver [?] indeed step on it, too quickly, lea[?] the passenger stranded.

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 17 January 19[?])

■ SOCIETY

Police cadets shown what Nazi death camps were like

Visits to former Nazi concentration camps have been introduced into the training programme for police cadets in West Berlin. The decision was made by the city's Interior Senator, Heinrich Lummer, following a case where a trainee Jewish policeman was persecuted.

A Polish woman, Hanna Wasiczenkso-Lubicz, describes an event in her life at Ravensbrück:

"On 6 October at the morning roll call, I felt sick. I went to the sick bay. At 2 pm my son was born. I was happy despite the terrible situation.

"After three days, I was taken to another sick bay where we (women) were kept two to a bed. Our babies, about 50 of them, were in another room.

"During the night, they were locked in and, although they cried, we were not able to go and see them. We knew they were freezing. The stove was tiny and the room was only between eight and 10 degrees (between 46 and 50 fahrenheit).

"Babies died every day. We mothers tried to calm them as best we could, but we were on all hunger diets. A week after the birth, I had to begin work again. My baby kept on deteriorating.

"I saw how an old man had grown out of that baby face. His small body was covered in sores and after 16 days he died from a lung infection . . ."

Frau Wasiczenkso-Lubicz had been brought into the camp two months before when she was seven months pregnant. Ravensbrück was built in 1939 near the town of Fürstenberg in the Uckermark, about 50 miles north of Berlin in what today is East Germany.

Between 1943 and 1945, 863 children were born in the camp. All died. So did 92,000 women and children.

In Sachsenhausen, just north of Berlin, it is estimated that more than 100,000 were shot, gassed or killed in some other way.

Forty graduates of the police school of Radelandweg, in Spandau, West Berlin, have visited both camps together with the West Berlin Interior Senator, Heinrich Lummer.

Herr Lummer arranged the visit following an incident in 1982. A young Israeli-born German training to be a policeman was discovered to have been persecuted for two years at the police school in Schulzendorf.

His fellow cadets had urinated in his bed, smeared his boots, chained him up during sports classes, played Hang de Jew, and told him that too few Jews has been gassed in the camps.

The case came to light when an instructor saw "Du Judensau" (You Jewish Pig) scrawled on the reverse side of a blackboard.

Lummer ordered an inquiry. He said in a report that nothing had been covered up and nothing glossed over. He was sure it was not a case of being the tip of the iceberg.

He spoke of an unfortunate set of circumstances that had made things worse. The 18-year-old victim had not taken some of the persecution too seriously. But in other cases he was intimidated by a fellow cadet. Above all, he seemed to have been determined to see it through on his own.

Lummer announced that cadet training should include visits to Nazi death camps so cadets could see for themselves the giant scale of the killings. The visits would become obligatory.

The cadets, aged between 18 and 22, half of them women, agreed that seeing what had taken place was a vastly different thing from merely hearing about it.

Heinrich Lummer, West Berlin Interior Senator, (without hat) with police cadet party, being guided through gates of Sachsenhausen. The lettering worked into the gate is the Nazi slogan, 'Arbeit macht Frei.' (Photo: AP)

They were subdued as they wandered through both sites, Sachsenhausen in the morning and Ravensbrück in the afternoon. "Shocking, difficult to grasp," one tried to explain.

At Sachsenhausen they left yellow roses at the spot where, 39 years ago to the day, 19 policemen from Luxembourg had been shot.

People from 50 nations were among the estimated more than 100,000 shot or gassed or disposed of in some other way at Sachsenhausen.

The cadet team were sure that a repeat of the persecution episode would not happen at their school. A few candidly admitted that they had heard virtually nothing about this pieces of unholy German history in school. None had previously visited a concentration camp.

But it is not only a handful of police cadets that have learnt little in the classroom about Nazi camps. Lummer said the day after the trip that he would recommend to the city's Education Senator, Hanna-Renate Laurien, that children should also be taken to the camps.

Lummer: "There are some things that you can talks about only so much. Then you actually have to go and see for yourself."

Karl-Heinz Baum

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 4 February 1984)

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[?]le, widowed, divorced and separated people, and the survey revealed that demographic factors alone were responsible for the increase.

The number of divorces has increased, meaning more divorcees living on their own, and fewer of them are remarrying. So they account for the increase in this category.

The growing number of widows and widowers living on their own, in contrast, is solely due to the fact that fewer of them are going to live with their children when the husband or wife dies.

Two factors seem to have influenced the increase in the number of singles who live on their own:

There has been a striking increase in the number of singles of both sexes as a result of the decline in the number of marriages.

Also, young people are leaving home to set up in life on their own earlier than they used to.

(Der Tagesspiegel, 29 January 1984)

Agency probes the darkest chapter in German history



Adalbert Rückerl . . . long campaign. (Photo: dpa)

There is an agency in Ludwigsburg, near Stuttgart, that owes its existence to the darkest chapter in German history.

It is the *Zentralstelle zur Verfolgung von NS-Verbrechen*, set up to investigate National Socialist crime.

This month the head, Adalbert Rückerl, 59, is retiring prematurely because of his health. He has spent most of his adult life investigating Nazi brutality.

Rückerl, who has worked with the agency since 1961 and headed it since 1966, is a senior public prosecutor.

He is to be succeeded by another senior public prosecutor, his deputy, Alfred Streim.

The agency itself is also changing. Investigation has been its main job, but gradually its function as a classifier and documenter of Nazi crime is becoming the central point.

Its files contain, among other things 1.3 million record cards and copies of half a million relevant documents.

Rückerl applied for a vacancy in the agency, which was founded in 1958, because he thought the material was interesting. He originally wanted to stay at Ludwigsburg for a limited time, but he was promoted in 1966 and took over the leadership.

The agency was founded because the job of investigating Nazi crime had become too big for the existing departments. But the initial public reaction to the new authority was lukewarm at best.

Rückerl says this was possibly because people thought it was another denazification programme in another form. However, the attitude changed gradually and after the television series, *Holocaust*, there was a sharp change in public attitudes.

There have even been charges that the agency is not doing enough, he says.

Rückerl and his colleagues have regularly to explain an apparent incongruity. Since 1945, legal teams have led investigations against more than 88,000 people. But up until last year, there had been barely 6,500 convictions.

There are, says Rückerl, several grounds why the number of suspects should be kept high. Not least is the statute of limtations. Gradually they had been able to isolate the guilty.

"In the statistics, this works against us," says Rückerl. "But we just have to live with it."

At the beginning of the 1970s, the organisation had 127 workers. Now it has only 35. Alone, 48 public prosecutors have been involved in the investigations.

The agency, under the jurisdiction of the Baden-Württemberg Ministry of Justice and partly financed by the *Länder*, has an annual budget of 3.6 million marks.

In the course of time it has become more of a documentation centre. Rückerl has visited many countries to give lectures. He has often been to Israel, where he experienced the occasional demonstration but heard nothing against either the agency or himself personally.

Like others confronted with details about Nazi crime, Rückerl became deeply bewildered. He learnt to recognise just what people are capable of doing.

And something else he learned was this: in the end, each is responsible for his or her deeds and cannot hide behind someone else's seniority. In this, he sees the meaning behind the whole process of continuing the investigation into Nazi crime.

Last year, the agency began 61 preliminary investigations and closed 96 cases. At the beginning of this year, it had 110 cases under investigation.

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 2 February 1984)